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20021 TAXATION OF CONTINGENT FEES
Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for
starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by
enslaving it.'
INTRODUCTION
Paula settles a discrimination lawsuit against her former
employer for $1,000,000. Pursuant to a contingent attorney's fee
agreement, $400,000 of the settlement goes to her attorney, and
Paula receives the remaining $600,000.2 Unbeknownst to Paula, the
settlement creates a troubling and controversial federal tax issue
regarding the proper treatment of the $400,000 attorney's fee.'
Eight circuit courts 4 as well as the Tax Court' have held that Paula
must include the full $1,000,000 settlement in her gross income and
then deduct the $400,000 fee (the inclusion and deduction method),
while three circuit courts have held that Paula may exclude the
attorney fee portion of the settlement from her gross income and
Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.).
2 In the typical case, the attorney would also be reimbursed out of the settlement
proceeds for costs advanced in prosecuting the case. For tax purposes, whether amounts paid
to the attorney represent attorney's fees or reimbursement of costs is immaterial.
Accordingly, this Article refers only to attorney's fees; however, the analysis is equally
applicable to costs.
' See Deborah A. Geier, Some Meandering Thoughts on Plaintiffs and Their Attorneys'
Fees and Costs, 88 TAX NOTES 531, 532 (2000) (describing issue discussed in this Article as
"hot topic" in tax law); James Serven, Tenth Circuit Joins Majority View on Contingent
Attorneys' Fee Issue, 94 TAX NOTES 373, 373 (2002) (noting that issue "has bedeviled the
courts over the past couple of years").
' Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312, 1314(10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1915
(2002); Sinyard v. Comm'r, 268 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2357,
2357 (2002); Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881, 883 (7th Cir, 2001); Young v. Comm'r, 240
F.3d 369, 372 (4th Cir. 2001); Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 219 F.3d 941,943 (9th Cir. 2000);
Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187, 1187 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 972, 972 (2001);
Bagley v. Comm'r, 121 F.3d 393, 304 (8th Cir. 1997); Alexander v. Comm'r, 72 F.3d 938, 946-
47 (1st Cir. 1995); Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1995); O'Brien v.
Comm'r, 319 F.2d 532, 532 (3d Cir. 1963).
5 Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 412 (2000), affd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
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include only $600,000, the amount of the settlement less attorney's
fees (the exclusion method).' The Supreme Court thus far has
evaded the issue, denying certiorari on three separate occasions.'
If, under the inclusion and deduction method, Paula was entitled
to a full and unimpaired deduction for the $400,000 of attorney's
fees, her tax consequences would be the same as under the exclusion
method, because she would ultimately be taxed only on the $600,000
she actually receives. Under current law, however, because the
attorney's fee deduction is classified as a miscellaneous itemized
deduction, Paula's deduction under the inclusion and deduction
method will be reduced under sections 67 and 68 of the Internal
Revenue Code ("Code").' More significantly, the deduction is
disallowed for purposes of computing her alternative minimum tax
(AMT") liability. 9 As a result, Paula's tax liability under the
inclusion and deduction method will significantly exceed her
Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 2000); Davis v. Comm'r, 210 F.3d
1346, 1348 (1 1th Cir. 2000); Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 858 (6th Cir.
2000); Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 121 (5th Cir. 1959).
See Sinyard v. Rossotti, 122 S. Ct. 2357, 2357 (2002) (mem.) (denying certiorari to
appeal from Ninth Circuit); Hukkanen-Campbell v. Comm'r, 122 S. Ct. 1915, 1915 (2002)
(mem.) (denying certiorari to appeal from Tenth Circuit); Coady v. Comm'r, 532 U.S. 972,972
(2001) (mem.) (denying certiorari to appeal from Ninth Circuit).
' I.R.C. §§ 67(b), 68 (2000). Paula's deduction is a miscellaneous itemized deduction
because it is classified as an unreimbursed employee business expense (rather than a
reimbursed employee business expense, which would result in an above the line deduction,
i.e., a deduction taken into account in computing Paula's adjusted gross income under §
62(a)(2)(A)). See Alexander v. Comm'r, 72 F.3d 938, 944-47 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that
employee's legal fees incurred in connection with litigation arising out of employee's
employment constitute unreimbursed employee business expenses subject to § 67(b)); Biehl
v. Comm'r, 118 T.C. 467, 471-87 (2002) (same). But see Laura Sager & Stephen Cohen, How
the Income Tax Undermines Civil Rights Law, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1096-97 (2000)
(arguing that deductions such as Paula's should be treated as reimbursed employee business
expenses). If Paula's deduction for attorney's fees was above the line, the issue discussed in
this Article would not arise. In such a case, Paula would be allowed a full and unimpaired
deduction under the inclusion and deduction method, and Paula's tax consequences would be
the same as under the exclusion method. I.R.C. § 62(a)(1).
The issue discussed in this Article arises only when taxable damages are recovered.
Thus, it would not arise when only compensatory damages arising from a physical injury are
recovered, because § 104(a)(2) would exclude the entire recovery, including the attorney fee
portion. See § I.R.C. 104(a)(2) (2000). In such a case, the plaintiff would not report any gross
income attributable to the recovery and would not be allowed a deduction for attorney's fees
pursuant to § 265(a)(1). See § 265(a)(1); see also Bent v. Comm'r, 835 F.2d 67, 70 (3d Cir.
1987) (holding that legal fees incurred in connection with recovery excluded under § 104(a)(2)
are nondeductible under § 265(a)(1)).
9 I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
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liability under the exclusion method. In effect, under the inclusion
and deduction method, Paula will pay tax on a portion of her
$400,000 legal fee as well as on her net recovery of $600,000.
From a tax policy perspective, Paula should pay tax only on her
net recovery of $600,000 because an individual should not pay tax
on the cost of producing taxable income.1" Thus, the exclusion
method provides the right policy result while the inclusion and
deduction method provides the wrong policy result.
The often heated debate among practitioners, judges, and
academics is whether current law mandates the exclusion method,
thereby producing the right policy result, or the inclusion and
deduction method, thereby producing the wrong policy result." The
focus of the debate has involved the appropriate characterization of
the contingent fee arrangement, and whether the arrangement
implicates the assignment of income doctrine.
Proponents of the exclusion method argue that the contingent fee
agreement transfers a portion (forty percent) of Paula's claim to her
attorney, and that such portion of the claim constitutes property, as
opposed to income, for purposes of applying the assignment of
income doctrine. 2 As a result, they conclude that this transfer
effectively shifts the burden of taxation with respect to the attorney
fee portion of the settlement from Paula to her attorney.'" Under
this analysis, when the $400,000 fee is paid to Paula's attorney, it
is attributable to property-the forty percent portion of the claim
owned by the attorney-and thereby not taxable to Paula.
Conversely, proponents of the inclusion and deduction method
'0 Hantzi v. Comm'r, 638 F.2d 248, 249 (1st Cir. 1981).
" Compare Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881, 883 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that
inclusion and deduction method is correct under current law), and Timothy R. Koski, Should
Clients Escape Tax on Lawsuit Proceeds Retained by Attorneys?, 92 TAX NOTEs 93, 97 (2001)
(same), with Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 858 (6th Cir. 2000) (concluding
that exclusion method is correct under current law), and Richard B. Kells, Problems with the
Government's Position in Taxing Attorneys'Fees, 93 TAX NOTES 1501, 1501-02 (2001) (same).
32 This Article draws a distinction between "property" for purposes of the assignment of
income doctrine and "property" for purposes of§ 83. See I.R.C. § 83 (2000) (providing for tax
treatment where property is transferred in connection with performance of services); infra
notes 195-210 and accompanying text (analyzing definition of term "property" for purposes
of § 83).




argue that the contingent fee agreement transfers from Paula to her
attorney a right to the income from a portion of the claim, rather
than a portion of the claim itself.4 These proponents submit that,
under the assignment of income doctrine, such a transfer is
ineffective for tax purposes."6 Consequently, they conclude that the
entire settlement amount (including the attorney fee portion) is
included in Paula's gross income.
Thus, the debate has focused on one particular issue, namely
whether a contingent fee agreement transfers income from a portion
of the claim, or transfers a portion of the claim itself. To state the
matter another way, and to use the famous assignment of income
metaphor, does the agreement transfer the fruit or the tree?"
Remarkably, even though the issue has been brought before eleven
circuit courts and the Tax Court,1 7 this focus has been entirely
misplaced. The assignment of income doctrine is inapplicable to
contingent fee arrangements because the doctrine does not apply to
arm's length commercial transactions. 8 By immediately jumping to
the fruit versus tree analysis, the courts have failed to appreciate
this point. Because of this fundamental error, no one has yet set
forth a correct analysis of the issue.
This Article attempts to provide such an analysis, demonstrating
that there are only two viable interpretations of the contingent fee
arrangement: either the arrangement results in no transfer
whatsoever until the attorney is actually paid, or alternatively, the
arrangement results in a transfer of property-regardless of
whether such property would constitute fruit or tree under the
assignment of income doctrine-at the time the contingent fee
agreement is executed. Further, under either interpretation, the tax
consequences to Paula are the same. She must include the full
amount of the settlement, including the attorney fee portion, in her
gross income and may take a miscellaneous itemized deduction for
14 See Kenseth, 259 F.3d at 884 (stating contingent fee contracts are not assignments and
Wisconsin law prohibits attorney from "assigning ownership of his client's claim").
"5 See id. (noting "an assignment of income ... by a taxpayer is ineffective to shift his tax
liability").
'8 See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930) (using fruit and tree metaphor).
'7 See supra notes 4-6.
's See infra notes 157-74 and accompanying text (arguing that assignment of income
doctrine does not apply to contingent fee arrangements).
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the attorney fee portion. Consequently, this Article concludes that
the wrong policy result is inevitable under current law, and that the
only solution to the problem is a change in the law.
Part I of this Article more deeply illustrates the contingent fee
problem and the mechanics of the relevant Code provisions. 9 Part
I also explains why, as a matter of tax policy, contingent attorney's
fees should be deductible in full without impairment.20  Part II
discusses the cases which have addressed the issue and led to the
current split of authority.2' Part III explains why the focus of these
cases-whether a contingent fee arrangement results in a transfer
of fruit or tree for purposes of applying the assignment of income
doctrine-has been misplaced.2 2 Part IV then provides a correct
analysis of the contingent fee issue under current law.23 Part IV
ultimately concludes that the inclusion and deduction method is
required, and therefore that the wrong policy result is inevitable
under current law.24 Part V addresses a creative argument made by
some proponents of the exclusion method-that the contingent fee
arrangement results in a partnership for tax purposes-and
concludes that this argument fails to achieve its intended result.25
Finally, Part VI proposes a legislative solution to fix the contingent
fee problem.2"
I. THE PROBLEM
A. THE MECHANICS OF THE PROBLEM
Assume that Paula, in the example above, regularly earns
$50,000 per year in wages, has no other income, and has no
deductions.27 As a result, Paula ordinarily takes the standard
19 See infra notes 27-49 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 50-80 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 81-99 and accompanying text.
n See infra notes 100-74 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 175-255 and accompanying text.
U See infra notes 238-55 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 256-308 and accompanying text.
See infra note 309 and accompanying text.
2 For purposes of the computations to follow, it is also assumed that Paulas filing status
is single, that she has no dependents, and that the year of settlement is 2002.
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deduction. 8
Under the inclusion and deduction method, Paula would treat the
entire $1,000,000 settlement as income, bringing her gross income
to $1,050,000. The $400,000 attorney's fee qualifies as a deduction
under section 162, since it constitutes an ordinary and necessary
expense in carrying on Paula's trade or business of being an
employee.2" Paula, however, may take this deduction only by giving
up her right to the standard. deduction.3" Moreover, since the
$400,000 fee constitutes a miscellaneous itemized deduction,3' it
may be deducted only to the extent that it exceeds two percent of
Paula's adjusted gross income.32 This reduces Paula's fee deduction
by $21,000."8 In addition, section 68 requires Paula to reduce her
fee deduction by three percent of the amount by which Paula's
adjusted gross income exceeds a statutorily defined "applicable
amount" ($137,300 in 2002). 34 This further reduces Paula's fee
deduction by $27,381.3' The amount of Paula's fee deduction
2' See I.R.C. § 63(b) (2000) (providing that taxpayers who do not elect to itemize their
deductions may take standard deduction).
" See Alexander v. Comm'r, 72 F.3d 938, 944.45 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding legal fees
deductible under § 162(a) where taxpayer incurred such fees in connection with breach of
contract and discrimination lawsuit against his former employer).
0 See I.R.C. § 63(b) (2000) (providing that taxpayers may elect either to take standard
deduction or to take their itemized deductions); § 63(d) (defining itemized deductions).
Paula's legal fee is an itemized deduction because it constitutes an unreimbursed employee
business expense. See supra note 8.
3" See supra note 8.
'2 I.R.C. § 67(a)-(b) (2000).
" Id. In Paula's case, because she has no above the line deductions under § 62(a), her
adjusted gross income equals her gross income, which is $1,050,000. See § 62(a). Accordingly,
the reduction under § 67(a) equals 2% of $1,050,000. See § 67(a).
'4 I.R.C. § -68(a) (2000); Rev. Proc. 2001.59, 2001.52 I.R.B. 623, § 3.08. To be precise, §68(a) reduces the aggregate amount of itemized deductions other than those specified in §
68(c) by the lesser of (i) 3% of the excess of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income over the
applicable amount, or (ii) 80% of the taxpayer's itemized deductions other than those specified
in § 68(c). I.R.C. § 68(a). In most instances, and in Paula's case, the amount of the reduction
will equal 3% of the excess of adjusted gross income over the applicable amount. See Robert
J. Peroni, Reform in the Use of Phaseouts and Floors in the Individual Income Tax System,
91 TAx NOTES 1415, 1425 (2001) (stating that "[flor most taxpayers, the lesser amount is 3%
of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income").
3' I.R.C. § 68(a) (2000). Applying the § 68(a) reduction to Paula, the amount of her
itemized deductions is reduced by $27,381, which is the lesser of (i) $27,381 (3% of the excess
of her adjusted gross income of $1,050,000 over the applicable amount of $137,300), or (ii)
$320,000 (80% of $400,000, the amount of her itemized deductions). Id.
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remaining after these reductions is $351,619.16 Thus, Paula's
taxable income equals $698,381, 37 and her tax liability under the
regular tax system would be $245,774.'
Because of the AMT, however, Paula's computation of her tax
liability does not end there."9 Paula may not claim the attorney's fee
as a deduction to reduce her alternative minimum taxable income.40
As a result, her AMT liability is $34,716, bringing her total tax
liability to $280,490.41
Alternatively, under the exclusion method, Paula's gross income
would include only the $600,000 of the settlement proceeds she
actually receives, and her $50,000 of wages. Since Paula has no
deductions, she would take the standard deduction of $4,700,
leaving her with $645,300 of taxable income.42 Therefore, the
exclusion method produces a tax liability of $225,285, 43 which is
$55,206 less than under the inclusion and deduction method.
Comparing the two results, we can see that the $55,206 differ-
ence is the result of the following four components: (1) the inability
' This amount is the excess of Paula's $400,000 of attorney's fees over the sum of the
reduction under § 67, which is $21,000, and the reduction under section 68, which is $27,381.
" See I.R.C. § 63(a) (2000). Under either the exclusion method or the inclusion and
deduction method, Paula's personal exemption deduction will be phased out pursuant to §
151(d)(3). See § 151(d)(3). For 2002, the personal exemption deduction is completely phased
out for single taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes in excess of $259,800. Id.; Rev. Proc.
2001-59, 2001-52 I.R.B. 623, § 3.11(2).
3 See I.R.C. § l(a) (2000) (providing taxation rate tables); Rev. Proc. 2001-59, 2001-52
I.R.B. 623 (providing inflation adjustments). This is the amount resulting from the
application of the inflation adjusted rate table for unmarried individuals provided in Rev.
Proc. 2001-59, 2001-52 I.R.B. 623, § 3.01 (Table 3).9 See I.R.C. § 55(a) (2000).
40 See I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
41 See I.R.C. § 55 (2000). Paula's alternative minimum taxable income will equal
$1,014,250, the amount of her gross income less her exemption amount of $35,750. See §
55(a), (d)(1)(B). Applying $1,014,250 to the AMT rates yields a tentative minimum tax of
$280,490. See § 55(b)(1)(A). Paula's AMT liability equals the excess of her tentative
minimum tax ($280,490) over her regular tax liability ($245,774). See § 55(a).
42 See I.R.C. § 63(b) (2000) (defining taxable income for taxpayers who take standard
deduction); § 63(2)(c) (providing standard deduction amount for single taxpayers prior to
adjustment for inflation); Rev. Proc. 2001-59, 2001-52 I.R.B. 623, § 3.07(1) (providing
inflation-adjusted standard deduction amount).
4 See I.R.C. § l(a) (2000) (providing taxation rate tables); Rev. Proc. 2001-59, 2001-52
I.R.B. 623 (providing inflation adjustments). This is the amount resulting from the
application of the inflation adjusted rate table for unmarried individuals provided in Rev.
Proc. 2001-59,2001-52 I.R.B. 623, § 3.01 (Table 3). Under the exclusion method, Paula would
not have any additional liability under the AMT. See I.R.C. § 55.
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under the inclusion and deduction method to take advantage of the
standard deduction in addition to the deduction for attorney's fees
(this component is the "loss of standard deduction" effect)," (2) the
section 67 reduction, (3) the section 68 reduction, and (4) the AMT.
In Paula's case, the $55,206 difference is attributable to the four
components as follows:45
"Loss of Standard Section 67 Section 68 AMT
Deduction" Effect Reduction Reduction
Difference Attributable $1,814 $8,106 $10,569 $34,716
to Each Component
" It should be noted that, if Paula had sufficient itemized deductions other than the
attorney's fee to cause her to itemize her deductions even in the absence of the settlement,
the "loss of standard deduction" effect would be nonexistent. If Paula would have itemized
even in the absence of the settlement, she would lose her standard deduction (because she
itemizes) regardless of whether the inclusion and deduction method or the exclusion method
applied. In addition, if Paula had sufficient miscellaneous itemized deductions other than the
attorney's fee to reach the § 67 floor even in the absence of the settlement, the adverse effect
of the § 67 reduction would also be removed. Lastly, if Paula had sufficient itemized
deductions other than the attorney's fee to absorb the entire reduction under § 68, the adverse
effect of the § 68 reduction would be removed. For example, if Paula had $30,000 of
miscellaneous itemized deductions before taking into account the attorney's fee, none of her
increased tax liability under the inclusion and deduction method would be attributable to the
"loss of standard deduction" effect, the § 67 reduction, or the § 68 reduction. In such a case,
her increased tax liability would result solely from the AMT.
4 Due to rounding, the values in the table do not sum precisely. The methodology for
allocating the difference in tax liability to the four components is detailed in this footnote.
Note that because the components are interrelated, several simplifying assumptions were
made. It was assumed, for purposes of determining the "loss of standard deduction" effect,
the § 67 reduction, and the § 68 reduction, that the AMT was repealed. Conversely, it was
assumed, for purposes of determining the effect of the AMT, that §§ 62, 67, and 68 would
remain in effect. In determining the difference in tax liability attributable to a specific
component, Paula's tax liability was computed four times: (1) under current law, subject to
simplifying assumptions, using the inclusion and deduction method; (2) under current law,
subject to simplifying assumptions, using the exclusion method; (3) assuming that the
particular component was repealed,. under the inclusion and deduction method; and (4)
assuming that the particular component was repealed, under the exclusion method. With
respect to a particular component, the "effect" equals the excess of(a), which is the excess of
(1) over (2), over (b), which is the excess of (3) over (4). For purposes of computing the "loss
of standard deduction" effect, the hypothetical repeal under computations (3) and (4) would
result in Paula being allowed to take beth the attorney's fee deduction and the standard
deduction, but would not reduce Paula's adjusted gross income for purposes of computing the
§ 67 reduction.
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As in most cases in which the contingent fee problem arises, the
effect of the AMT on Paula's tax liability is most significant.46
The contrast in tax consequences under the two methods becomes
even more dramatic as the ratio of the attorney's fees to the gross
settlement amount increases.47 This increased disparity occurs
solely as a result of the AMT component. For example, if Paula paid
sixty percent of the settlement-rather than forty percent-to her
attorney, she would owe $132,406 of additional tax under the
inclusion and deduction method versus the exclusion method.48 The
$132,406 difference is attributable to the four components as
follows:
49
"Loss of Standard Section 67 Section 68 AMT
Deduction" Effect Reduction Reduction
Difference Attributable $1,814 $8,106 $10,569 $111,916
to Each Component
" See Geier, supra note 3, at 532 (stating that "the biggest consequence for [plaintiffs
subject to the contingent fee problem] is not under the regular tax system but rather under
the alternative minimum tax system"); Sager & Cohen, supra note 8, at 1077 (stating that
"[t]he disallowance of AMT deductions [for attorney's fees] is particularly significant").
" In fact, Judge Beghe of the Tax Court has noted that if the ratio of attorney's fees to
gross settlement amount is high enough, a pre-tax gain would be transmuted into an after-tax
loss. Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 425-26 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting). In other words,
the inclusion and deduction method may, under certain circumstances, result in a victorious
plaintiff owing more tax attributable to her recovery than the amount of her recovery net of
attorney's fees. The absurdity of such a result has not escaped the attention of the popular
press. See Adam Liptak, Tax Bill Exceeds Award to Officer in Sex Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
11, 2002, § 1, at 18 (describing case of discrimination plaintiff who, despite obtaining
$1,250,000 judgment, ends up with after-tax loss of $99,000).
' In this example, under the inclusion and deduction method, Paula's gross income
would equal $1,050,000, and the amount of her fee deduction would equal $600,000. Under
§ 67(a), the deductions would be reduced by $21,000 (2% of her adjusted gross income) and,
under § 68, the deductions would be reduced by another $27,381 (3% of the excess of her
adjusted gross income over the applicable amount of $137,300). See I.R.C. §§ 67(a), 68 (2000).
Thus, her taxable income would equal $498,381, and her regular tax liability would equal
$168,574. See §§ 1, 63. The AMT tax rates would be applied to an amount equal to
$1,014,250, the amount of her gross income less the exemption amount of $35,750. See §
55(b)(2). As a result, her additional tax liability under the AMT would be $111,916, bringing
her total tax liability to $280,490. See § 55.
Under the exclusion method, Paula's gross income would equal $450,000. Paula would
take the standard deduction of $4,700; accordingly, her taxable income would equal $445,300.
See I.R.C. § 63(b)-(c) (2000). Her tax liability would equal $148,084. See § 1.
" Due to rounding, the values in this table do not sum precisely.
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B. TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Under the inclusion and deduction method, Paula effectively pays
tax on a portion of the settlement proceeds which are used to pay
her attorney. Under this method, Paula's tax liability in the original
hypothetical' is $55,206 greater than when the $400,000 fee is
merely excluded from gross income; at Paula's 38.6% marginal rate,
Paula is effectively taxed on $143,021 of the fees that she pays to
her attorney. 51 The tax policy question is whether Paula should be
taxed on any portion of the money that goes to her attorney.
5 2
This question can be analyzed from both a broad and narrow
perspective. From the broad perspective, the analysis focuses on the
issue of whether any part of the settlement proceeds that are paid
to the attorney should constitute income to Paula. The narrow
perspective focuses on the specific deduction limitations that apply
to the fees, namely the limitations under Code sections 67 and 68
and the disallowance of the deduction under the AMT. This latter
perspective seeks to determine the purposes of these limitations and
inquires whether these purposes are served when the limitations
are applied to Paula's attorney's fees.
1. The Broad Perspective-What is Income? A fundamental
principle of taxation is "that a person's taxable income should not
include the cost of producing that income."" Under this principle,
Paula should not pay tax on any portion of the $400,000 in attor-
ney's fees, since these fees were the cost of producing Paula's
$600,000 recovery. Because the inclusion and deduction method
effectively requires Paula to pay tax on a portion of these attorney's
50 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
s, This amount equals the quotient derived by dividing (i) the $55,206 additional tax
liability under the inclusion and deduction method by (ii) Paula's marginal tax rate of 38.6%.
In effect, Paula would be taxed, under the inclusion and deduction method, on her $50,000
ofwages, the $600,000 of settlement proceeds that she actually receives, and $143,021 of the
settlement proceeds which go to her attorney. See Robert W. Wood, Even Tax Court Itself
Divided on Attorneys' Fees Issue!, 88 TAX NOTES 573, 573 (2000) (concluding that plaintiffs
will, under inclusion and deduction method, "end up paying tax on a good portion of the
money the attorney received").
52 The fact that the attorney is taxed on his fees is irrelevant to this inquiry. See Geier,
supra note 3, at 545-46 (using example to show why "It]he taxation of one party does not
depend on the taxation of another absent a specific code provision specifying otherwise").
53 Hantzis v. Comm'r, 638 F.2d 248, 249 (1st Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 37:57
TAXATION OF CONTINGENT FEES
fees, it violates this fundamental principle.
The Haig-Simons definition of income confirms this conclusion.
This definition of income, the most widely accepted among tax
theorists,"' provides that income during a given time period equals
the "sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption
and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights
between the beginning and end of the period in question."55 In other
words, income equals consumption plus net accumulation of
wealth.56
Paula's attorney's fees cannot count toward the "accumulation of
wealth" prong of Haig-Simons since she actually experiences a
decrease, rather than an increase, in wealth upon payment of the
fees.5 Furthermore, although the boundaries of the term "consump-
tion" in the Haig-Simons definition are not entirely clear,5" it is clear
that none of the $400,000 paid to the attorney should be considered
a consumption expenditure. Paula pays the amount for the sole
purpose of generating the settlement; as a result, the fees are
business- or investment-type expenditures rather than consump-
tion-based expenditures."
54 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKEEN, 1 FEDERALTAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND
GIFTS 3.1.1 (1999); Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45, 46 (1990).
1 HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938). For a discussion of the merits and limitations of the
Haig-Simons definition of income, see BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 54, at 1 3.1.1.
' If the taxpayer experiences a net decrease in wealth during the time period, then
income under Haig-Simons would equal the excess of consumption over such net decrease.
SIMONS, supra note 55, at 50.
" Even though Paula experiences an increase in wealth in the amount of $1,000,000
upon settlement, when she pays her attorney, her wealth is reduced by $400,000. Thus, her
net accumulation of wealth resulting from the settlement equals $600,000. Whether Paula's
income under Haig-Simons equals only $600,000 or some greater amount depends on whether
the attorney's fee, or any portion of it, contributes to Paula's consumption.
" See generally William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86
HARV. L. REV. 309 (1972); Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Ideal
Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343 (1989); Louis Kaplow, The Income Tax as Insurance: The
Casualty Loss and Medical Expense Deductions and the Exclusion of Medical Insurance
Premiums, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1485 (1991); Stanley A. Koppelman, Personal Deductions Under
an Ideal Income Tax, 43 TAX L. REv. 679 (1988); Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be
Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980).
" See Laura Sager & Stephen Cohen, Kafka at the Tax Court: The Attorney's Fee in
Employment Litigation, 96 TAX NOTES 1503, 1507 (2002) (noting that "attorney's fee in
employment litigation... virtually never provides personal consumption benefits").
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Because the attorney fee portion of the settlement neither results
in Paula's accumulation of wealth nor contributes to her consump-
tion, none of the $400,000 in attorney's fees should be included in
Paula's income. Thus, by effectively including $143,021 of the
attorney's fees in Paula's income, the inclusion and deduction
method results in an overstatement of income, according to the
Haig-Simons definition of income.
2. The Narrow Perspective- What are the Purposes of the
Deduction Limitations? Another way to analyze the tax policy
question is to inquire whether the statutory purposes behind the
deduction limitations that apply to Paula's attorney's fees under the
inclusion and deduction method (i.e., sections 67 and 68, and the
AMT) are implicated when Paula pays her attorney. As explained
below, applying these limitations to Paula's fee deduction does not
further any of these purposes.
a. Limitations Under Sections 67 and 68. Section 67 serves as
a "floor" for the deductibility of miscellaneous itemized deductions;
they are deductible only to the extent they exceed, in the aggregate,
two percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income.' When section
67(a) was added to the Code in 1986, the Joint Committee on
Taxation explained Congress's intentions:
The Congress concluded that the prior-law treatment
of... [certain] deductions fostered significant complex-
ity, and that some of these expenses have characteristics
of voluntary personal expenditures. For taxpayers who
anticipated claiming such itemized deductions, prior law
effectively required extensive recordkeeping with regard
to what commonly are small expenditures. Moreover,
the fact that small amounts typically were involved
presented significant administrative and enforcement
problems for the Internal Revenue Service. These
problems were exacerbated by the fact that taxpayers
frequently made errors of law regarding what types of
expenditures were properly allowable under prior
law....
6o I.R.C. § 67 (2000).
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The use of the deduction floor also takes into account
that some miscellaneous expenses are sufficiently
personal in nature that they would be incurred apart
from any business or investment activities of the tax-
payer.6
1
Based on this legislative history, Professor Deborah Geier concluded
that, in enacting section 67, Congress targeted small deductions
which "had only a very tenuous relationship to any income-produc-
ing activity and had personal-consumption benefits as well."62
Professor Geier cites a casual investor's subscription to the Wall
Street Journal as the prototypical expenditure with which Congress
was concerned."3 The expenditure is small in amount, and although
information read in the Wall Street Journal may help the reader
increase his taxable income, the subscription does not have a clear
and direct relationship to increased income production.6 4 Further-
more, reading the Wall Street Journal likely provides some personal
consumption benefits; in fact, the reader might have subscribed to
the Journal even in the absence of any investment activity6 5
6' STAFF OFTHE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 100TH CONG., GENERALEXPLANATION OFTHETAX
REFORM ACT OF 1986 78-79 (Comm. Print 1987).
6 Geier, supra note 3, at 533. Thus, Congress enacted the section 67 floor to further the
following two policy goals: (1) to more accurately compute a taxpayer's true income, and (2)
to simplify the Code. JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, supra note 61, at 78-79. In computing income
under the Haig-Simons ideal, any expenditure which gives rise to personal consumption
should be nondeductible to the extent of the value of the personal consumption. See Daniel
I. Halperin, Business Deductions for Personal Living Expenses: A Uniform Approach to An
Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 859, 878-80. Accordingly, under an ideal income tax,
every quasi-personal expense would be split into two components, a deductible business
component and a nondeductible personal consumption component. Id. Of course, this
division would be impracticable. Id. at 880. See also S. SURREY ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION, CASES & MATERIALS 496 (1972). As a result, Congress provided a bright line rule
that miscellaneous itemized deductions are deductible only to the extent that they exceed the
floor. JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, supra note 61, at 78-79. In addition, the floor arguably creates
simplification benefits since any taxpayer who will not have sufficient miscellaneous itemized
deductions to reach the floor will be able to forgo the recordkeeping and computations
required under pre-floor law. See id. For an analysis of whether § 67 actually furthers these
policy goals, see Peroni, supra note 34, at 1425.





Congress's concerns in enacting section 67 are not implicated
when Paula pays her attorney.66 The amount of the fee is not small,
but rather very significant in relation to Paula's overall financial
circumstance. More importantly, Paula receives no discernable
personal consumption benefit from paying this fee, and the fee has
a clear and direct relationship to taxable income. 7
The section 68 limitation generally reduces the amount of a
taxpayer's itemized deductions if the taxpayer's adjusted gross
income exceeds a threshold amount.6 Professor Peroni has
described section 68 as simply a mechanism to raise revenue by
increasing "the effective tax rates of higher-income taxpayers in a
nontransparent fashion.'" 6' Despite this revenue raising purpose,
the section 68 reduction does not apply to all itemized deductions. 70
Rather, section 68 targets itemized deductions that have been
"criticized as allowing deductions for amounts that really should be
considered part of the taxpayer's standard of living or consump-
tion."' 7' Consequently, all of the miscellaneous itemized deductions,
as well as deductions for home mortgage interest, charitable
contributions, and state and local taxes, are subject to the section 68
reduction. 72 However, itemized deductions which do not contribute
to the taxpayer's standard of living or consumption, such as
deductions for medical expenses, investment interest, casualty or
theft losses, and gambling losses, are specifically exempted from the
section 68 reduction.73 Since Paula's payment of attorney's fees does
Id. at 534.
o Id.
u I.R.C. § 68(a) (2000).
" Peroni, supra note 34, at 1426. In other words, the purpose of § 68 was to raise
revenue by imposing higher effective tax rates on wealthy taxpayers without raising the tax
rates in § 1. Id. at 1425-26. Section 68 "effectively imposes a 1% tax on adjusted gross income
above the [statutorily defined] threshold amount." Id. at 1425.
70 I.R.C. § 68(a), (c) (2000). If Congress's sole consideration in enacting § 68 was to raise
revenue in a nontransparent fashion, it could have subjected all itemized deductions to the
§ 68 reduction.
"' Calvin H. Johnson, Simplification: Replacement of the Section 68 Limitation on
Itemized Deductions, 78 TAX NOTES 89, 90 (1998).
72 See I.R.C. § 68(a) (providing that itemized deductions are subject to reduction); § 68(c)
(providing that, for purposes of § 68(a), itemized deductions do not include deductions for
medical expenses, investment interest, casualty or theft losses, or gambling losses).
'a I.R.C. § 68(c) (2000). Gambling losses are only deductible to the extent that they do
not exceed the taxpayer's gambling gains in a given year. See § 165(d). Because gambling
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not contribute to her standard of living or consumption, her
deduction for these fees is not within the intended target of section
68.
7 4
b. AMT. Congress enacted the AMT to ensure that taxpayers
with substantial economic income do not escape taxation through
excessive use of deductions and credits.75 In computing AMT
liability, all miscellaneous itemized deductions are disallowed.76
Although legislative history does not explain the rationale behind
this disallowance, Professor Geier concluded that it is likely based
on Congress's "doubts about the legitimacy of the deductions."" In
other words, the disallowance under the AMT of miscellaneous
itemized deductions is based on the notion that these deductions
have significant personal consumption components and only a
tenuous relationship to business or investment activity.78 Because
Paula's attorney's fees have no personal consumption element and
because they bear a clear and direct relationship to taxable income,
the disallowance of miscellaneous itemized deductions under the
AMT should not, as a matter of policy, apply to these fees.7"
Accordingly, when viewed from either the broad or the narrow
perspective, Paula's attorney's fees should be deductible in full
without impairment. Therefore, the exclusion method provides the
correct tax policy result, while the inclusion and deduction method
does not."0
loss deductions may be used only to offset gambling gains, these losses do not contribute to
the taxpayer's standard of living or consumption. But see Daniel Shaviro, The Man Who Lost
Too Muck Zarin v. Commissioner and the Measurement of Taxable Consumption, 45 TAX L.
REV. 215, 231-33 (1990) (arguing that, in principle, cost of gambling should be split into two
components, nondeductible personal consumption component and investment component;
under this approach even gambling losses not in excess of gambling gains would include
personal consumption component).
" See Geier, supra note 3, at 534.
15 BORISBIrrKERETAL., FEDERALINCOMETAXATIONOFINDIVIDUALS 145. 1, at 45-1 to 45-
2 (3d ed. 2002). For an analysis of the impact of the AMT, see Robert P. Harvey & Jerry
Tempalski, The Individual AMT.: Why it Matters, 50 NATL TAX. J. 453, 463-71 (1997).
76 I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A) (2000).
7' Geier, supra note 3, at 534.
78 Id. at 533-34.
Id. at 534.
so See Peroni, supra note 34, at 1423 (stating that inclusion and deduction method
provides "an inappropriate result from a tax policy point of view"); Sager & Cohen, supra note
8, at 1103 (stating that "tax policy considerations should favor permitting plaintiffs either to
deduct fully or to exclude the recovery of attorney's fees"); James Serven, Oral Argument in
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II. THE CONTINGENT FEE CASES
All of the cases that have considered the contingent fee issue
have focused on the assignment of income doctrine.8" In particular,
courts have analyzed whether a plaintiff, upon execution of a
contingent fee agreement, either transfers a portion of her claim to
her attorney or merely a right to the proceeds from a portion of the
claim.82
A. THE MINORITY VIEW-THE PROPERTY TRANSFER CASES
The minority view, followed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh
Circuits, maintains that a contingent fee agreement transfers a
portion of the claim to the attorney83 and that such portion consti-
tutes property (i.e., tree) for purposes of the assignment of income
Hukkanen-CampbelL Taxpayer's Last Stand?, 93 TAX NOTES 854, 859 (2001) (stating that
"[t]here is simply no public policy or conceptual theory by which the denial of a deduction
under the AMT for... attorney's fees... can be plausibly defended"). Professors Sager and
Cohen also contend that the effect of the inclusion and deduction method "undermines the
national policy of encouraging the pursuit of meritorious civil rights claims." Sager & Cohen,
supra note 8, at 1078.
"' For an extended discussion of the contingent fee cases, see Geier, supra note 3, at 535-
49.
82 See infra notes 83-99 and accompanying text.
" Although the Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits all concluded that a contingent fee
agreement transferred a portion of the claim to the attorney, they differed with respect to
their level of reliance on state attorney lien law. The first in this line of cases, the 1959 Fifth
Circuit decision in Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119, 125 (5th Cir. 1959), relied on the
Alabama attorney lien statute (which governed the taxpayer's relationship with her attorney)
that gave attorneys "the same right and power over [claims] as their clients had ... for the
amount due thereon to them." The Cotnam court also noted that Alabama case law
interpreting this statute had found the attorney lien to have priority even over the
defendant's right of set-off. Id. at 125. The Eleventh Circuit, in Davis v. Commissioner, 210
F.3d 1346, 1347 (11th Cir. 2000), found Cotnam to be controlling precedent in another case
involving Alabama law. Note that, under Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209
(11th Cir. 1981), decisions of the Fifth Circuit-such as Cotnam-rendered prior to the
creation of the Eleventh Circuit are binding precedent on the Eleventh Circuit. In Estate of
Clarks v. Commissioner, 202 F.3d 854, 856 (6th Cir. 2000), the Sixth Circuit evaluated
applicable Michigan attorney lien common law, as there was no attorney lien statute, and
concluded that it "operate[d] in more or less the same way as the Alabama lien in Cotnam."
However, notwithstanding its prior holding in Cotnam, the Fifth Circuit recently stated in
Srivastava v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 353, 364 (5th Cir. 2000), that state attorney lien law
was irrelevant to its conclusion that the contingent fee agreement transferred a portion of the
claim.
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doctrine.84 For example, in reaching its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit
invoked the familiar tree versus fruit distinction made in assign-
ment of income cases:
The present transaction under scrutiny is more like a
division of property than an assignment of income. Here
the client as assignor has transferred some of the trees
in his orchard, not merely the fruit from the trees. The
lawyer has become a tenant in common of the orchard
owner and must cultivate and care for and harvest the
fruit of the entire tract.85
Because these cases (the "property transfer cases") determine that
a contingent fee agreement transfers property rather than income,
they conclude that the assignment of income doctrine does not
require the plaintiff to include the attorney fee portion of the
settlement in her gross income."
This analysis has two problems, which are comprehensively
discussed in Parts III and IV 7 and are summarized here. First, the
issue of whether a contingent fee agreement transfers tree or fruit
is irrelevant; the assignment of income doctrine does not apply
under either scenario." Second, the property transfer cases do not
follow through on the tax analysis required by their factual
determinations.89 If, as these cases held, the contingent fee
agreement results in a transfer of property for tax purposes,"° then
such transfer has tax consequences regardless of whether such
property constitutes fruit or tree for purposes of the assignment of
income doctrine. Had these courts followed through on their
8 Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 359; Davis, 210 F.3d at 1347; Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 856;
Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125-26.
s Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857-58.
In other words, the property transfer cases determine that when the attorney receives
his fee, the fee is attributable to property owned by the attorney; therefore, they conclude that
the plaintiff is not required to include the attorney fee portion of the settlement in gross
income. See id., Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 363; Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125.
87 See infra notes 100-255 and accompanying text.
* See infra notes 157-74 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 237-55 and accompanying text.
90 Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 359; Davis, 210 F.3d at 1347; Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 856;
Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125-26.
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analysis, they would have found that, even under their characteriza-
tion of the contingent fee arrangement, the plaintiff would still be
required to include the full settlement amount in her gross income.
B. THE MAJORITY VIEW-THE ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME CASES
The majority view, followed by the Federal, First, Third, Fourth,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, and the Tax Court,
maintains that a contingent fee agreement does not transfer a
portion of the plaintiffs claim to the attorney, but rather transfers
a right to the proceeds from such portion of the claim.9' Under this
view, such a transfer constitutes a transfer of income (i.e., fruit) that
is disregarded for tax purposes under the assignment of income
doctrine.
These cases (the "assignment of income cases") determine that
the plaintiff retains ownership of the entire claim after the contin-
gent fee agreement is executed. 2 The assignment of income cases
base this determination on two factors. First, the cases cite the
significant degree of control that the plaintiff retains with respect
I Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312, 1314(10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1915
(2002); Sinyard v. Comm'r, 268 F.3d 756, 758-59 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming United States Tax
Court), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2357(2002); Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881,883-84 (7th Cir.
2001) (affirming United States Tax Court); Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369, 376-77 (4th Cir.
2001); Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 219 F.3d 941, 943 (9th Cir. 2000); Coady v. Comm'r, 213
F.3d 1187, 1189 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 972 (2001); Bagley v. Comm'r, 121 F.3d
393, 395.96 (8th Cir. 1997); Alexander v. Comm'r, 72 F.3d 938,942-43 (1st Cir. 1995); Baylin
v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1454-55 (Fed. Cir. 1995); O'Brien v. Comm'r, 319 F.2d 532, 532
(3d Cir. 1963).
' Although the assignment of income cases all conclude that a contingent fee agreement
does not transfer a portion of the plaintiff's claim to the attorney, they differ with respect to
their level of reliance on state attorney lien law in reaching this conclusion. Some of the cases
distinguish applicable state attorney lien law from the attorney lien statute analyzed in
Cotnam v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959). See Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d
1312, 1314 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1915 (2002) (distinguishing Missouri law);
Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 972 (2001)
(distinguishing Alaska law); O'Brien v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 707, 712 (1962), affid, 319 F.2d 532
(3d Cir. 1963) (distinguishing Pennsylvania law). Other cases have affirmatively concluded
that state attorney lien law is irrelevant. Sinyard v. Comm'r, 268 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2357 (2002); Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369, 377-79 (4th Cir.
2001); Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C 399, 421 (2000) (Chabot, J., dissenting). Finally, some
cases do not discuss state attorney lien law at all, implicitly concluding that it is irrelevant.
See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001); Bagley v. Comm'r, 121 F.3d 393 (8th
Cir. 1997); Alexander v. Comm'r, 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995).
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to the claim.9 3 For example, the Fourth Circuit stated:
We ... do not accept the suggestion ... that a contin-
gent fee arrangement gives an attorney a portion of a
client's cause of action. The client still controls the
claim (or property) and ultimately decides to forego,
pursue, or settle that claim.94
Second, some of the assignment of income cases note that applicable
state law prohibits attorneys from acquiring a proprietary interest
in the claims of their clients.s5
Because these cases determine that the plaintiff retains owner-
ship of the entire claim, they hold that a contingent fee agreement
only transfers a right to the income from the claim. For example,
the Seventh Circuit explained:
In essence, [taxpayer] wants us to recharacterize this as
a case in which he assigned 40 percent of his tort claim
to the law firm. But he didn't. A contingent-fee contract
is not an assignment, and [under applicable state law]
the lawyer is prohibited from acquiring ownership of his
client's claim. So what [taxpayer] really is asking us to
do is to assign a portion of his income to the law firm,
but of course an assignment of income (as distinct from
the assignment of a contract or an asset that generates
income) by a taxpayer is ineffective to shift his tax
liability.9 6
See, e.g., Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312, 1313-14 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
122 S. Ct. 1915 (2002); Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881, 884 (7th Cir. 2001); Young v.
Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 2001); Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 219 F.3d 941, 943
(9th Cir. 2000); Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S.
972 (2001); Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 414 (2000), aff'd 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
9 Young, 240 F.3d at 378.
9 See, e.g., Kenseth, 259 F.3d at 883-84 (affirming United States Tax Court applying
Wisconsin law); Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 414 ('In Wisconsin, a lawyer cannot acquire a propriety
interest that would enable the attorney to continue to press a cause of action despite the
client's wish to settle.").
" Kenseth, 259 F.3d at 884 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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Based on their determination that the transfer resulting from a
contingent fee agreement is ineffective under the assignment of
income doctrine, these cases conclude that the plaintiff must include
the full settlement amount, including the attorney fee portion, in
her gross income. 7 As discussed in Part IV, the assignment of
income cases reach the right doctrinal result;"8 however, their
reasoning is substantially flawed.9 These cases rely on the
assignment of income doctrine, but the doctrine simply has no
relevance to a contingent attorney fee arrangement.
III. THE ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME DOCTRINE
As Part II explained, the courts have focused on whether a
contingent fee agreement transfers fruit or tree.10° The property
transfer cases determine that the agreement transfers tree,
meaning the attorney fee portion of the claim, and consequently
conclude that the plaintiff may exclude the attorney fee portion of
the settlement.0 1 The assignment of income cases determine that
the agreement transfers fruit, meaning the right to the proceeds
from the attorney fee portion of the claim, and thereby conclude that
the plaintiff must include the entire settlement amount in gross
income." 2 This Part demonstrates that this analysis by the courts
is misguided.03
The assignment of income doctrine has no relevance to the
contingent attorney fee cases. Subject to a single caveat that is not
relevant to these cases,0 4 the doctrine applies only to gratuitous
transactions in which a right to income is transferred without
9 See, e.g., Kenseth, 259 F.3d at 884, Coady, 213 F.3d 1187, 1199, Young, 240 F.3d 369,
376-78.
9 See infra notes 175-255 and accompanying text. However, as discussed in supra notes
50-80 and accompanying text, this result-that the plaintiff must include the full settlement
amount in gross income and take a miscellaneous itemized deduction for the attorney fee
portion-violates tax policy principles.
9 See infra notes 157-74 and accompanying text.
10 See supra notes 81-99 and accompanying text.
'0' See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
102 See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text
100 See infra notes 157.74 and accompanying text.
'' See infra notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
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consideration. ' 5 The doctrine does not apply to an arm's length
transaction in which a right to income is transferred for value.'3 In
the contingent fee cases, the purported income right (the right to the
proceeds from the attorney fee portion of the claim) is assigned for
value (legal services) in an arm's length transaction.10'7 Because the
assignment of income doctrine does not apply, the issue of whether
a contingent fee agreement transfers fruit or tree is irrelevant.
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME DOCTRINE:
PROTECTING THE PROGRESSIVE RATE STRUCTURE
The assignment of income doctrine was initially developed by
courts to prevent the subversion of the progressive rate structure of
the tax system through the use of artificial income-splitting between
related parties."0 8 The seminal Supreme Court assignment of
income cases involved fact patterns in which income was assigned
gratuitously. For example, in Lucas v. Earl, a high-earning
husband assigned one half of his future earnings to his low-earning
wife.109 In Helvering v. Horst,"0 a father assigned rights to interest
payments to his son; and in Helvering v. Eubank,"' a taxpayer
assigned his right to future insurance renewal commissions to a
family trust. In each of these cases, the Court disregarded the
gratuitous assignments for tax purposes, creating a common law
doctrine now known as the assignment of income doctrine."'
106 See infra notes 126-56 and accompanying text.
'06 See id.
,o7 See infra notes 157-74 and accompanying text.
"0 For general discussions of the assignment of income doctrine, see Charles S. Lyon &
James S. Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case,
17 TAx L. REV. 293, 296-301 (1962); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Expanding the Taxable Unit:
The Aggregation of the Income of Children and Parents, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60, 80-95 (1981);
Ralph S. Rice, Judicial Trends in Gratuitous Assignments to Avoid Federal Income Taxes, 64
YALE L.J. 991, 993-1004 (1955); Stanley S. Surrey, Assignments of Income and Related
Devices: Choice of the Taxable Person, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 831-33 (1933).
"O 281 U.S. 111, 113-14(1930). Mr. Earl was a corporate executive and an attorney who
received an aggregate amount of salary and fees in excess of $20,000 in each of 1920 and
1921, the taxable years at issue. Earl v. Comm'r, 10 B.T.A. 723, 723-24 (1928). None of the
opinions stated whether Mrs. Earl was employed.
10 311 U.S. 112, 114 (1940).
"' 311 U.S. 122, 125 (1940).
11 Ronald H. Jensen, Schneer v. Commissioner: Continuing Confusion Over the
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Although in these early cases the Supreme Court never explicitly
explained the policy behind the assignment of income doctrine, the
policy has always been clear. Professor Ronald Jensen explains:
Here is the essence of the assignment of income doc-
trine: the concern that the progressive tax rate schedule
not be subverted by permitting income to be artificially
split among formally separate taxpayers who in fact
constitute a single economic unit. In more recent years,
the courts have become more candid in acknowledging
this policy as the basis for the assignment of income
doctrine. For example, the Supreme Court in 1973
extolled the doctrine as "a cornerstone of our graduated
income tax system." Today, this explanation is common-
place among both courts and commentators."'
Thus, the assignment of income doctrine has at its roots the
substance over form principle that income-splitting arrangements
are disregarded to the extent they lack true substance." 4 Even
though income may be earned as a formal matter by one taxpayer,
if it is earned in substance by another taxpayer, the income should
be taxed to such other taxpayer.
The substance over form aspect of the doctrine is evident in the
Horst case, in which a father assigned to his son rights to future
interest payments from bonds retained by the father. " 5 As a matter
Assignment of Income Doctrine and Personal Service Income, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 623, 628-33
(1993).
"' Id. at 632 (first emphasis added) (citations omitted).
" It does not matter whether tax avoidance drives the artificial income.splitting
arrangements. The key issue is whether the arrangements lack true substance. For
example, in Lucas v. Earl, the most influential assignment of income case, the parties clearly
had no tax avoidance purposes because the agreement to split income was made in 1901. 281
U.S. 111, 113 (1930). At that time, no federal income tax existed, because the 1894 income
tax was declared unconstitutional in 1895. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S.
429, 442 (1895), overruled on other grounds by South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 524
(1998). The Sixteenth Amendment, which corrected the constitutional infirmity, was ratified
in 1913. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. For a discussion of the history of the federal income tax,
see 1 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 54, 11.1.
" Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 114 (1940).
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of form, the payor made the interest payments directly to his son.11 6
However, the Supreme Court found that the substance of the
transaction was inconsistent with its form. " The Court recast the
transaction by treating the father as first receiving the interest
payments and then transferring the payments to his son.118 The
Court reasoned that, because the father controlled the bonds, which
were the source of the income, he was in substance the owner of the
income payments. " 9
The Horst Court used the now-familiar fruit and tree
metaphor. 12' The interest payments were the fruit borne by the tree
(i.e., the bonds) and were attributed to the owner of the tree
regardless of any artificial arrangement by which the fruit was
diverted to another taxpayer.1 21 On the other hand, if the father had
transferred the bonds-the tree itself-to his son, the future interest
payments accruing on the bond would have been taxable only to the
son. 1 22 Thus, related parties can effectively split income through the
transfer of income-producing property but not through the transfer
of mere rights to income from such property.
Consequently, the line was drawn between income-producing
property (tree) and mere income (fruit). In determining whether an
arrangement to split income among related parties is "artificial" or
"lacks substance," courts have focused on the issue of whether
income-producing property is transferred or whether the income
from such property is transferred.1 23 The former would be respected
for tax purposes, and therefore would result in an effective income-
splitting technique. 24 The latter would be disregarded under the
116 Id. at 117.
" Id. at 117-18.
"8 Id. at 117.
119 Id.
'2 Id. at 120.
121 Id. at 117-18, 120.
12 SeeBITTKERET AL., supra note 75, 1 34.1, at 34-5 (stating that "[a] transfer of stocks,
bonds, real estate, or other income-producing assets will effectively shift tax liability for
subsequent investment income to the new owner'). However, accrued but unpaid interest
generally would be taxable to the transferor. See Austin v. Comm'r, 161 F.2d 666, 668 (6th
Cir. 1946) (holding that where taxpayer gratuitously transferred bond with accrued but
unpaid interest, taxpayer was taxed on such interest as it was paid to transferee).
123 See BITrKER ET AL., supra note 75, at 34.03[3], 34-22 to 34-24.
124 See, e.g., Blair v. Comm'r, 300 U.S. 5 (1937) (holding that transfer of equitable interest
in trust was effective).
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assignment of income doctrine, and therefore would be ineffective as
an income-splitting technique.12
B. LIMITED APPLICATION OF THE ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME DOC-
TRINE IN COMMERCIAL CASES
Because courts developed the assignment of income doctrine to
prevent the exploitation of the progressive rate structure through
artificial arrangements in which related taxpayers split income,
126
the policy behind the doctrine is not implicated in an arm's length
transaction. Arm's length parties simply do not engage in artificial
arrangements designed to split income. Therefore, the assignment
of income doctrine should not apply in commercial cases where
independent parties transact. 127  The courts have followed this
rule. 28
" See, e.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1940) (holding that transfer of
interest coupons detached from bonds was ineffective).
' See Jensen, supra note 112, at 632.
12? See Michael Asimow, Applying the Assignment of Income Principle Correctly, 54 TAX
NOTES 607, 608 (1992) ("(The] [a]ssignment of income [doctrine] is an indispensable weapon
to protect progressivity and to attack tax avoidance schemes. It should not be used to
overturn economically rational, nontax avoidance contractual arrangements."); Jensen, supra
note 112, at 633.
All [of the seminal assignment of income) cases... involved gratuitous
assignments of income. What should the rule be when the right to future
personal service income is assigned, or exchanged, for consideration? If,
as is commonly agreed, the assignment of income doctrine is intended to
preserve the integrity of the graduated tax rate schedule, the assignor
should be taxed on the amount he receives for the assignment but no
more, while any amount collected by the assignee over and above the
amount paid for the assignment should be taxed to the assignee.
Id.; Elliott Manning, The Service Corporation-Who is Taxable on Its Income: Reconciling
Assignment of Income Principles, Section 482, and Section 351,37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 657,668-
69 (1983).
[I]n either Horst or Earl, if the transferee had paid the transferor the
discounted value of the future income at the time of the assignment, there
is little doubt that each transferor would have been taxed upon receipt of
the consideration, ... [and that] the transferee would have been taxed on
the amount received as salary or interest, but only to the extent that the
payments received exceeded the consideration given.
Id.
'~ See, e.g., Comm'r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 262-68 (1958) (finding that where
taxpayer sold rights to oil and other mineral payments for fair market value, taxpayer
realized income at time of sale, rather than as oil and mineral payments were received by
buyer); Estate of Stranahan v. Comm'r, 472 F.2d 867, 870-71 (6th Cir. 1973) (holding that
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For example, in Estate of Stranahan v. Commissioner, "9 a
taxpayer sold to his son a right to receive future dividends, while
retaining the underlying stock, in exchange for $122,820, the
present value of the dividends.' The taxpayer was motivated by a
desire to accelerate income in order to take advantage of significant
deductions available to him in the year of sale.131 The taxpayer took
the position that he realized $122,820 of income upon the sale.'32
The IRS disagreed, arguing that the taxpayer realized income as the
dividends were paid to his son.
133
where taxpayer sold rights to future dividends for fair market value, taxpayer realized income
at time of sale, rather than as dividends were received by buyer); Davis v. Comm'r, 119 T.C.
No. 1, 3-7 (2002) (holding that where taxpayer sold rights to future lottery payments for fair
market value, taxpayer realized income at time of sale, rather than as lottery payments were
received by buyer); see also Rev. Rul. 83-46, 1983-1 C.B. 16 (ruling that where taxpayer was
assigned overriding royalty interest in oil and gas-entitling taxpayer to specified fraction of
future production-in exchange for services, taxpayer realized income at time of assignment,
rather than as proceeds of interest were received); infra notes 219-36 and accompanying text
(discussing Revenue Ruling 83-46); cf. Schuster v. Comm'r, 800 F.2d 672, 676-79 (7th Cir.
1986) (holding that where taxpayer gratuitously deflected salary to religious order pursuant
to her vow of poverty, taxpayer was taxed on salary as it was received by religious order).
Courts occasionally have applied the assignment of income doctrine in commercial
cases, however. See, e.g., Johnson v. Comm'r, 698 F.2d 372, 374 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying
assignment of income doctrine when taxpayer assigned rights to future salary in arm's length
transaction); Schneer v. Comm'r, 97 T.C. 643, 662-63 (1991) (applying assignment of income
doctrine when taxpayer assigned rights to income to unrelated partnership in arm's length
transaction). These cases simply misapplied the assignment of income doctrine. See Asimow,
supra note 127, at 608 (criticizing Schneer); Jensen, supra note 112, at 668-76 (criticizing
Johnson); id. at 654-56, 676-80 (criticizing Schneer); Manning, supra note 127, at 662
(criticizing Johnson).
In addition, courts have applied the assignment of income doctrine in cases where the
right to income was assigned in a transaction that, while not wholly gratuitous, was not
entirely at arm's length. See, e.g., Kochansky v. Comm'r, 92 F.3d 957, 958-59 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that where attorney assigned right to portion of contingent fee to his former wife in
connection with their divorce, attorney realized income when portion of fee was paid to wife);
Leavell v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. 140, 148-59 (1995) (holding that where taxpayer assigned rights
to future salary to his wholly owned personal services corporation, taxpayer realized income
as salary was paid to corporation); see also Basye v. United States, 410 U.S. 441, 451-53
(1950) (holding that where partnership deflected income to trust which benefitted its partners
and its employees, partnership realized income in the amount of deflected payments); infra
notes 147-56 and accompanying text (distinguishing Bayse facts from contingent fee
arrangements). These cases are readily distinguishable from the contingent fee cases, which
involve commercial transactions between completely unrelated parties.
'2 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973).
'30 Id. at 868.




The Tax Court held in favor of the IRS, citing the assignment of
income doctrine:
Borrowing the simile from Helvering v. Horst, the 1964
assignment [of the right to future dividends] was of the
fruit of the tree and not the assignment of the tree itself.
In other words, the [taxpayer] kept the "tree" and
"assigned" part of the "fruit." By retaining the stock, the
[taxpayer] controlled the source of the income and he
directed its disposition in "assigning" or diverting it to
his son.3
4
Consequently, the Tax Court concluded that the assignment was
ineffective for tax purposes and held that the taxpayer realized
income when the dividends were received by his son, not when the
sale was consummated.
1 35
The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the assignment of
income doctrine did not apply to the case:
[T]he substance of a transaction, and not the form,
determines the taxable consequences of that transac-
tion.... In the present transaction, however, it appears
that both the form and the substance of the agreement
assigned the right to receive future income. What was
received by the [taxpayer] was the present value of that
income the son could expect in the future .... Essen-
tially, [taxpayer's] son paid consideration to receive
future income....
We recognize the oft-stated principle that a taxpayer
cannot escape taxation by legally assigning or giving
away a portion of the income derived from income
producing property retained by the taxpayer.... Here,
however, the acceleration of income was not designed to
avoid or escape recognition of the dividends but rather
13 Estate ofStranahan v. Comm'r, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1078,1083 (1971), reud, 472 F.2d 867
(6th Cir. 1973) (citations omitted).
135 Id.
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to reduce taxation by fully utilizing a substantial inter-
est deduction which was available .... [Ihe fact that
this was a transaction for good and sufficient consider-
ation, and not merely gratuitous, distinguishes the
instant case from the line of authority beginning with
Helvering v. Horst....
[T]he fact that valuable consideration was an integral
part of the transaction distinguishes this case from those
where the simple expedient of drawing up legal papers
and assigning income to others is used. The Tax Court
[below] uses the celebrated metaphor of Justice Holmes
regarding the "fruit" and the "tree," and concludes that
there has been no effective separation of the fruit from
the tree. Judge Cardozo's comment that "metaphors in
law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices
to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it"... is
appropriate here, as the genesis of the metaphor lies in
a gratuitous transaction, while the instant situation
concerns a transaction for a valuable consideration.'l3
Thus, even though the parties were related, and in spite of the
father's clear tax avoidance motive, the Estate of Stranahan court
did not apply the assignment of income doctrine because the parties
transacted at arm's length."3 7 The court respected the form of the
transaction, holding that the taxpayer was taxed on the sales
proceeds he received in the year of sale, rather than on the bdivi-
dends as they were paid to his son."
There is one caveat to the general rule that the assignment of
income doctrine does not apply in commercial cases: where a right
to income is sold in an arm's length transaction, the doctrine has
been invoked for the limited purpose of determining the character
of the seller's income. For example, in Commissioner v. P.G. Lake,
Inc.,139 the taxpayer sold oil and other mineral payment rights to an
" Estate of Stranahan, 472 F.2d at 869-70 (citations omitted).
137 Id. at 867.
'38 id. at 871.
"" 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
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unrelated third party for a lump sum. 40 Had the taxpayer received
the oil and other mineral payment rights in due course, rather than
selling them for a lump sum, the taxpayer would have realized
ordinary income.14 The Court gave the sale tax effect, holding that
the taxpayer realized income in the year of sale.' Furthermore,
citing the seminal assignment of income cases, the Court held that
the character of this income was ordinary since the sale proceeds
served as "essentially a substitute for what would otherwise be
received at a future time as ordinary income."'43
Thus, the assignment of income doctrine has two distinct roles.'"
First, in cases where a mere right to income is assigned gratuitously
while the assignor retains control of the source of the income, the
doctrine causes the transferor to be taxed on the income as it is paid
to the transferee. 4" Second, in cases where a mere right to income
is sold in an arm's length transaction, the doctrine applies for a
limited purpose, namely to tax the sales proceeds as ordinary
income rather than capital gain. 46
"'0 Id. at 261-62.
.. Id. at 265.
14 Id. at 264. This determination by the Court supports the notion that, except for the
limited purpose of determining character, the assignment of income doctrine does not apply
where a right to income is sold for value. Id. If the assignment of income doctrine applied
in full force, the Court would have determined that the taxpayer realized income as the
payments were received by the buyer, rather than at the time of sale. Cf. Helvering v. Horst,
311 U.S. 112, 119 (1940) (holding that gratuitous donor of interest coupons realized income
when interest paid to donee).
"' Comm'r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 265 (1958) (citations omitted).
"' See Michael Asimow, The Assault on Tax-Free Divorce: Carryover Basis and
Assignment of Income, 44 TAX L. REV. 65, 84 (1988):
Over many decades, the courts have developed a two-branch doctrine
generally referred to as assignment of income. The first branch, called
donative assignment of income, establishes which of several possible
taxpayers should pay tax on an item of income. The second branch,
capital gains assignment of income, holds that certain assets do not
qualify for the capital gains preference.
Id.; Lyon & Eustice, supra note 108, at 296 (noting that "[t]he [assignment of income] cases
generally involve two situations-donative and commercial-and two corresponding
issues--choice of taxpayer and rate of tax").
"' See, e.g., Horst, 311 U.S. at 117 (holding that where taxpayer gratuitously assigned
right to interest payments from bond, taxpayer is taxed on interest payments as they were
received by transferee).
'" See, e.g., P.G. Lake, 356 U.S. at 266 (holding that proceeds of sale of oil and other
mineral payment rights taxable as ordinary income, not capital gain).
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Some have suggested that the Supreme Court case of Basye v.
Commissioner '47 undermines the notion that the assignment of
income doctrine does not apply in commercial cases except to
determine the character of income.148 In Basye, a medical partner-
ship entered into a contract with a health plan pursuant to which
the partnership would perform medical services for the participants
of the plan.149 In consideration for these services, the plan would
make payments to both the partnership and a retirement trust that
would pay deferred compensation to the partnership's physicians. 150
The partnership had approximately 205 physician partners and
approximately 41 physician-employees of the partnership.151 The
issue in Basye was whether the partnership realized income when
the health plan made payments to the retirement trust.152 The
character of the income was not at issue.1 5 The Court ruled that
the partnership did realize this income when the trust was funded,
citing the assignment of income doctrine.
154
At first glance, Basye appears irreconcilable with the notion that
the assignment of income doctrine applies in commercial cases only
to determine the character of income. Upon closer analysis,
however, it becomes clear that the relevant parties did not transact
on an entirely arm's length basis. There was a substantial overlap
between the owners of the partnership and the potential beneficia-
ries of the trust.y5 As a result of this overlap, the deflection of
'47 410 U.S. 441 (1972).
'" See, e.g., Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Basye for
proposition that "[tihere is nothing about arm's-length transactions that need preclude
anticipatory assignments in that context"); Koski, supra note 11, at 97 (citing Basye for
proposition that "[a]lthough gratuitous transfers may warrant special scrutiny, the
assignment of income doctrine is equally applicable to arm's-length transactions").
,9 Basye, 410 U.S. at 442-43.
ISo Id. In order to receive the payments, the physicians would have to meet specified
criteria. For instance, a physician would have to complete at least fifteen years of continuous
service with the partnership before retirement, or ten years ifthe physician had attained the
age of sixty-five at retirement, in order to be eligible to receive payments from the trust. Id.
at 444.
"' Appendix to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 82-83, Basye v. Comm'r, 410 U.S. 441
(1972) (No. 7-1022).
152 Basye, 410 U.S. at 447.
113 Id. at 457.
151 id. at 447-48.
15 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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income by the partnership to the trust could be characterized as a
quasi-gratuitious assignment of income. Thus, Basye is easily
distinguished from the contingent fee cases, where the plaintiff and
the attorney---completely independent parties--engage in a wholly
commercial arm's length transaction. 5 '
C. INAPPLICABILITY OF THE ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME DOCTRINE TO
CONTINGENT FEE ARRANGEMENTS
The courts faced with the contingent fee issue have attempted to
determine whether the assignment of income doctrine applies by
inquiring whether a contingent fee arrangement transfers property
or income to the attorney.'57 In so doing, the courts, like the Tax
Court in Estate of Stranahan, have leaped to the fruit-tree metaphor
without first analyzing whether the doctrine has any relevance.
In rushing to the fruit-tree question, the courts have overlooked
the policy behind the assignment of income doctrine-to prevent
artificial income-splitting arrangements from subverting the
" Another, and perhaps better, way to reconcile Basye would be to conclude that as a
matter of theory, the Court's analysis was erroneous, although its ultimate holding might be
supportable on administrative convenience grounds. As a purely theoretical matter, the
partnership realized income when the health plan made payments to the trust, not under the
assignment of income doctrine, but because the partnership received the benefit of having its
employees' retirement benefits funded by the health plan. Id. at 446-47. This benefit is
taxable, and the only question concerns the value of the benefit. If the health plan received
no benefit by making payments to the trust, as opposed to making them directly to the
partnership, the valuation issue would be easy; it would be clear that the value of the benefit
received by the partnership equaled the amount of the payments themselves. See Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716, 731 (1929) (holding that when employer paid employee's
federal income taxes, employee realized income in amount of federal income tax payments).
However, in Basye, the partnership asserted that the health plan received a benefit by
funding the trust. 410 U.S. at 446. Specifically, the partnership contended that the terms
of the trust created an incentive for the physician to remain affiliated with the partnership
(or other partnerships that provided services for the health plan), thereby ensuring that the
health plan would have "a stable and reliable group of physicians." Id. Assuming the
accuracy of this contention, the valuation issue would be quite difficult, since any payment
to the trust would have to be bifurcated between the portion that benefited the partnership
and the portion that benefited the health plan. The partnership's portion would be included
in the partnership's gross income. See Old Colony Trust, 279 U.S. at 731. Thus, the Court's
conclusion-that the partnership realized income on a dollar for dollar basis as the trust was
funded under the assignment of income doctrine-avoided this bifurcation and provided a
highly administrable rule, even though as a matter of pure theory, the Court's reasoning was
flawed. Basye, 410 U.S. at 457.
157 See supra notes 81-98 and accompanying text.
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progressive rate structure.'58 In the contingent fee cases, the
attorney and the plaintiff are not engaging in any artificial arrange-
ment to split income; rather, they are engaging in an entirely arm's
length commercial transaction. 159 The plaintiff, in return for the
attorney's promise to provide legal services, promises to transfer a
percentage of her ultimate recovery to the attorney. 6 ' As in Estate
of Stranahan, the substance of the transaction is entirely consistent
with its form.' 6 '
Compare the contingent fee cases with a hypothetical in which a
plaintiff purports to assign a claim to his son in a gratuitous
transaction. This hypothetical implicates the policy concerns behind
the assignment of income doctrine. If successful, the father's
assignment would result in income-splitting. Whether the income-
splitting is merely artificial and therefore subject to the assignment
of income doctrine depends on whether the claim constitutes
property or income for assignment of income purposes. Even if the
claim constitutes property, there remains the issue of whether the
father transfers the claim or merely a right to the income from the
claim. Therefore, in order for the gratuitous assignment to be
effective for tax purposes, two conditions must be satisfied. First,
the claim must constitute property for purposes of the assignment
of income doctrine. Second, the father must transfer the claim itself
and not merely the right to the proceeds from the claim.
A recent IRS private letter ruling addressed these issues.162
Although the conclusions of a letter ruling are not binding prece-
dent, 3 the ruling is illustrative of the assignment of income
"" See supra notes 108-25 and accompanying text.
... See Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 362 (5th Cir. 2000):
The main reason for a client to sign a contingent fee contract, presumably,
is not to avoid taxation by anticipatorily assigning future streams of
income to others in exchange for non-monetary benefits. More likely, he
signs it to secure the services of an attorney without having to put any
capital at risk, and to encourage the attorney to perform well by offering
a personal stake in the claim.
Id.
160 Id.
... See Estate ofStranahanv. Comm'r, 472 F.2d 867, 871 (6th Cir. 1973) (holding taxpayer
realized income at time of sale of rights to future dividends).
12 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-07-019 (Nov. 16, 2000).
'6 I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) (2000).
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doctrine analysis that is required when a claim is gratuitously
assigned. 64 In the ruling, the taxpayer gratuitously assigned a
claim "'65 for punitive damages to a charitable trust. 6" Subsequent
to the assignment, an unspecified amount of punitive damages was
paid to the taxpayer, who thereafter transferred the damages to the
trust pursuant to the assignment.1 7 The issue was whether the
assignment of the taxpayer's claim was effective for tax purposes.'
If so, the taxpayer would not be required to include the punitive
damages amount in gross income.'69 Alternatively, if the assign-
ment was ineffective under the assignment of income doctrine, the
taxpayer would be required to include the punitive damages amount
in gross income and would be entitled to a charitable deduction. 170
The IRS concluded that the assignment was effective for tax
purposes, determining that the claim constituted property, rather
than income, for purposes of the assignment of income doctrine.'
17
' Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-07-019 (Nov. 16, 2000).
' Id. This is a slight simplification of the facts. Because the taxpayer had hired an
attorney on a contingency basis, the taxpayer only transferred the non-attorney fee portion
of the punitive damages claim to the trust. Id. Thus, if the contingent fee agreement
provided that the attorney would receive 40% of any recovery, the taxpayer would have
transferred the remaining 60% portion of the punitive damages claim to the trust. Id.
" At the time of the assignment, a judgment for punitive damages had been awarded,
but the judgment was on appeal. Id. The fact that the claim had ripened into a judgment at
the time it was assigned-as opposed to an assignment of a prejudgment claim-was not
relevant to the IRS analysis. Id. For example, the IRS concluded that "a transferor who
makes an effective transfer of a claim in litigation to a third person prior to the time of the
expiration of appeals in the case is not required to include the proceeds of the judgment in
income under the assignment of income doctrine." Id. (emphasis added). The IRS distinction
between a transfer of a claim prior to the expiration of appeals and a postappeal transfer is
discussed infra in note 173.
"" Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201-07-019 (Nov. 16, 2000).
168 Id.
169 Id.
17' Id. However, the charitable deduction would be subject to the limitations of§ 170. See
I.R.C. § 170 (2000). Although the ruling did not specify whether the trust was a public charity
or a private foundation, because the trust was established by the taxpayer, the trust was
likely a private foundation. See § 170(b)(1)(E). As a result, under § 170(b), the charitable
deduction generally would be limited to 30% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. See §
170(b)(1)(B).
171 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-07-019 (Nov. 16, 2000). In its analysis of the issue, the IRS did not
place any emphasis on the nature of the claim, which arose out of an automobile accident that
caused the death of the taxpayer's son. Id. One wonders how the IRS would have ruled had
the claim in question arisen out of the taxpayer's employment. For example, assume that the
claim was for lost wages resulting from the wrongful termination of the taxpayer's
employment. Would the IRS have ruled that such claim constitutes "property" or "income"
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With regard to the issue of whether the taxpayer transferred the
claim itself or merely a right to proceeds, the IRS determined that
the assignment was "an effective transfer of a claim in litigation,"
relying on the fact that under state law the assignment transferred
the taxpayer's right, title, and interest in the claim to the charitable
trust.172 As a result, the IRS held that the taxpayer was not
required to include the punitive damages amount in gross income. 7 '
for purposes of the assignment of income doctrine? An argument could be made that all
claims should be treated equally for purposes of the assignment of income doctrine regardless
of the origin of the claim, since all claims are economically the same in that they all represent
a right to income. Under this view, based on the IRS analysis in the ruling, the IRS would
hold that even a claim for lost wages constitutes property for purposes of the assignment of
income doctrine. See id. Alternatively, it can be argued that a right to wages, even one which
is disputed, is inherently a "fruit" since it arises directly out of the taxpayer's efforts.
' Id. The IRS drew a distinction between the taxpayer's transfer to the trust and the
taxpayer's purported transfer to her attorney pursuant to a contingent fee agreement. Id.
While the IRS determined that the taxpayer's transfer to the trust was an effective transfer,
the IRS concluded that the contingent fee agreement "did not transfer any interest in the ...
cause of action to [taxpayer's] attorney." Id. In support of its conclusion, the IRS cited the
terms of the agreement, which the IRS described as a contract of employment, and applicable
state attorney lien law, which provided a lien on the proceeds of the plaintiffs recovery rather
than on the cause of action itself. Id. In addition, the IRS emphasized that at no point could
the attorney "exercise dominion and control over [taxpayer's] cause of action." Id.
"' Id. However, the IRS determined that, if the taxpayer had transferred the claim after
all appeals were exhausted, the taxpayer would be required to include the punitive damages
amount in gross income. Id. The reasoning behind this determination is not clear from the
ruling. The IRS noted that, prior to the exhaustion of the appeals, the "recovery on the
transferred claim ... is doubtful or contingent," and that after appeals are concluded the
recovery is "certain." Id. The IRS, in distinguishing between a postappeal transfer and a
transfer that occurs prior to the exhaustion of appeals, apparently relied on the rule that if
property is gratuitously transferred with "ripe fruit" attached, the ripe fruit is taxable to the
transferor. See id. Alternatively, if the attached fruit is "contingent," then the fruit, if and
when it is paid to the transferee, is not taxable to the transferor. For example, it has been
held that where a taxpayer gratuitously transfers a bond with accrued interest, the accrued
interest generally will be taxable to the transferor when the accrued but unpaid interest is
paid to the transferee. Austin v. Comm'r, 161 F.2d 666, 668-69 (6th Cir. 1947). However, if
at the time the bond is transferred there is substantial doubt as to whether the accrued
interest will be collected, the transferee rather than the transferor will be taxed on the
accrued interest if and when it is paid to the transferree. Wellhouse v. Tomlinson, 197 F.
Supp. 739, 741-42 (S.D. Fla. 1961). It appears as though the IRS ruling reasons that, if a
claim is transferred prior to the exhaustion of all appeals, a tree (the claim) with contingent
fruit (the doubtful and uncertain recovery) is transferred; on the other hand, if a claim is
transferred postappeal, a tree (the claim) with ripe fruit (the certain recovery) is transferred.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-07-019 (Nov. 16, 2000). As a theoretical matter, the issue of whether
contingent fruit or ripe fruit is transferred should be irrelevant since the risk of subverting
the progressive rate structure exists in both cases. See Lyon & Eustice, supra note 108, at
356 (noting that "it is difficult to defend the rule.., that the donor will escape taxability
completely on any accrued but unpaid interest arrearages where there is doubt in the year
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In a gratuitous assignment of a claim, this sort of analysis is
appropriate because the risk of artificial income-splitting is present.
However, in the contingent fee cases, this analysis is unwarranted
because any transfer resulting from a contingent fee agreement is
an assignment for value in an arm's length transaction where there
is no risk of artificial income-splitting. 74 Consequently, in the
contingent fee cases, the courts' focus on whether a contingent fee
agreement transfers income or property is misplaced. In an
assignment for value case, it does not matter whether the taxpayer
transfers fruit or tree.
IV. THE CORRECT ANALYSIS OF THE CONTINGENT FEE
ARRANGEMENT
Thus far, this Article has argued that the assignment of income
doctrine has no relevance to the contingent fee cases."1 5 This Part
will provide the appropriate analysis of the issue, demonstrating
that there are really only two mutually exclusive characterizations
of the gift as to the ultimate collectibility of the interest").
Another issue, which was not addressed in the ruling, is whether the taxpayer could
have taken a charitable deduction for the contribution of the punitive damages claim. Since
the ruling held that the taxpayer transferred property to the charitable trust, a question
arises as to whether the taxpayer could take a deduction for the fair market value of such
property at the time of the assignment, or whether such a deduction would be limited to the
taxpayer's basis in the property, which was zero. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-07-019 (Nov. 16,
2000). The latter result is appropriate for two different reasons. First, § 170(e)(1)(A) provides
that, with respect to charitable contributions of appreciated property, the amount of the
charitable deduction is limited to the property's basis if, upon a hypothetical sale of the
property for its fair market value, all of the gain would have been ordinary income or short-
term capital gain. I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A) (2000). Had the taxpayer sold the punitive damages
claim, all of the gain would constitute ordinary income. See Comm'r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356
U.S. 260, 264-65 (1958). Accordingly, under § 170(e)(1)(A), the amount of the charitable
deduction would be zero. See I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A). Second, § 170(e)(1)(B)(ii) provides that
with respect to charitable contributions of appreciated property to a private foundation, the
amount of the charitable deduction is limited to the property's basis. See § 170(e)(1)(B)(ii).
Although the ruling does not specify whether the trust was a private foundation as opposed
to a public charity, since the taxpayer established the trust, it was likely a private foundation.
See § 170(b)(l)(E). As a result, under § 170(e)(1)(B)(ii), the amount of the charitable deduction
would be zero. See § 170(e)(1)(B)(ii).
"7 See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text. Moreover, P.G. Lake is not relevant
to the contingent fee cases, since the character of the plaintiff's income is not in dispute. See
Comm'r v. P.G. Lake, 356 U.S. 260, 261 (1958).
'T5 See supra notes 157-74 and accompanying text.
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of a contingent fee arrangement.17 Either a contingent fee agree-
ment results in a transfer of property at the time the agreement is
executed or it does not.1 " It is important to emphasize that the term
"property" as used in the preceding sentence means property for
section 83 purposes, rather than property for purposes of the
assignment of income doctrine. Because the assignment of income
doctrine does not apply to the contingent fee cases, it does not
matter whether the transferred property would constitute fruit or
tree for purposes of the assignment of income doctrine.
The issue of whether a contingent fee agreement results in an
immediate transfer of property is a difficult one, and the answer is
not entirely clear. However, as this Part demonstrates, the issue is
entirely academic because the tax consequences are the same
regardless of how the issue is ultimately resolved. 7 ' Under either
characterization, the plaintiff must include the full settlement
amount in gross income.179
A. THE NO IMMEDIATE TRANSFER CHARACTERIZATION
One view of a contingent fee arrangement is that the execution
of the fee agreement does not result in an immediate transfer of
property. Under this view, the contingent fee agreement is purely
executory in that the plaintiff merely promises to pay a contingent
amount of money at some point in the future, with the amount of
money dependent on the size of any recovery. The tax consequences
of this promise are quite simple. The making of the promise, upon
execution of the fee agreement, is inconsequential for federal income
tax purposes since it is merely a promise to make a future
payment."s In other words, nothing happens for tax purposes when
the contingent fee agreement is executed.
176 See infra notes 179-237 and accompanying text.
177 See id.
... See infra notes 179-255 and accompanying text.
179 See id.
" See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 1985) (providing that "unfunded and
unsecured promise to pay money or property in the future" does not constitute property for
purposes of § 83; accordingly, making of promise by plaintiff and receipt of promise by
attorney are inconsequential for tax purposes).
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When the case is ultimately settled, the plaintiff must include the
full amount of the settlement in gross income'' and take a miscella-
neous itemized deduction for the attorney's fees paid.182 Further-
more, it does not matter whether the plaintiff or the defendant
writes the check to the attorney. Under the famous case of Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner,' the defendant's satisfaction of
the plaintiffs obligation to pay her own attorney is treated as a
payment by the defendant to the plaintiff, followed by a payment
from the plaintiff to her attorney.
84
The following example demonstrates the consequences of the no
immediate transfer characterization:
In Year 1, Plaintiff enters into a contingent fee agree-
ment that provides that Plaintiff is obligated to pay
Attorney forty percent of the amount of any settlement.
In Year 5, the claim is settled. Pursuant to the settle-
ment, the Defendant writes a $1,000,000 check payable
to Attorney, who writes a $600,000 check payable to
Plaintiff.
Assuming that the contingent fee agreement does not result in an
immediate transfer of property, the execution of the agreement in
Year 1 is inconsequential for tax purposes. Plaintiff is merely
agreeing to make a future contingent payment. When the claim is
settled, Plaintiff must include the full $1,000,000 settlement in
gross income and will receive a $600,000 miscellaneous itemized
deduction.15 The fact that Defendant wrote the check to the
attorney is irrelevant under Old Colony Trust, because by making
the payment to Attorney, Defendant discharged Plaintiffs obligation
to make such a payment. 8 '
I' I.R.C. § 61(a) (2000).
182 I.R.C. §§ 67(b), 162(a) (2000); see also supra note 8.
'83 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
'84 Id. at 729-30.
'8 See I.R.C. §§ 61, 67(b) (2000); Alexander v. Comm'r, 72 F.3d 938, 944-47 (holding that
employee's legal fees incurred in connection with litigation arising out of employee's
employment constitute unreimbursed employee business expenses subject to § 67(b)).
'N 279 U.S. at 729-30. The tax consequences would be the same even if Defendant wrote
two checks, one for $600,000 payable to Plaintiff, and the other for $400,000 payable to
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B. THE IMMEDIATE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY CHARACTERIZATION
The alternative view of the contingent fee agreement is that the
execution of the agreement results in an immediate transfer of
property under section 83. As explained below, section 83 would
require the plaintiff to include the full amount of the settlement,
including the attorney fee portion, in her gross income."'
Section 83 applies to all transactions in which property is
transferred in connection with the performance of services.'" Since
it is clear that attorneys and clients enter into contingent fee
agreements in connection with the performance of services, the key
issue in determining the applicability of section 83 is whether such
agreements result in a transfer of property. The regulations under
section 83 define the terms "transfer" and "property."'8 9
The regulations state that "a transfer. .. occurs when a person
acquires a beneficial ownership interest in . . . property."'" In
determining whether a transfer occurs, the regulations provide that
any risk that the transferee may subsequently forfeit the property
is disregarded.' 9 ' For example, if ABC, Inc. transfers 100 shares of
its stock to an employee, a transfer occurs even if the employee is
obligated to return the stock if he leaves the company prior to the
expiration of a specified period of time.'92
Attorney. See id.
1 See infra notes 238-55 and accompanying text.
'm I.R.C. § 83(a) (2000). If property is transferred in connection with the performance of
services, § 83 applies regardless of whether the services are performed in an employee or
independent contractor capacity. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(a)(1) (1978). For a discussion of the
history and background of § 83, see 3 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 54, 60.4.1; Ronald
Hindin, Internal Revenue Code Section 83 Restricted Stock Plans, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 298
(1974).
'" Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(a) (as amended in 1985) (defining transfer); Tress. Reg. § 1.83-3(e)
(as amended in 1985) (defining property).
0 Tress. Reg. § 1.83.3(a)(1) (as amended in 1985).
,9, Id. In general, any restriction, other than a restriction which by its terms will never
lapse, on the transferee's full enjoyment of the property is disregarded in determining
whether a transfer occurs. Id. As discussed in Part IV.B.4, under the immediate transfer of
property characterization, the property that the attorney receives is subject to a substantial
risk of forfeiture which lapses upon final disposition of the plaintiffs case. See infra notes
238-43 and accompanying text. Accordingly, under Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(a), this risk of
forfeiture is disregarded in determining whether a transfer occurs under § 83 when the
contingent fee agreement is executed. Tress. Reg. § 1.83-3(a)(1).
2 See Tress. Reg. § 1.83-3(a)(1). Because the risk of forfeiture lapses after the specified
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The section 83 regulations broadly define the term "property" to
include "real and personal property other than either money or an
unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money or property in the
future."1 3  Case law and IRS rulings have affirmed this broad
definition of property. 194
In determining whether section 83 applies to the contingent fee
arrangement, the decisive issue is whether the fee agreement
results in a transfer of property for purposes of section 83. The
following two alternative property interests might be transferred
immediately upon execution of the contingent fee agreement: (1) a
portion of the claim might be transferred, or (2) a right to the
proceeds from a portion of the claim might be transferred. In either
case, the property interest that is transferred would constitute
property for section 83 purposes, as discussed below.' 95
1. Is a Claim Property Under Section 83? The discussion in this
subsection assumes that a contingent fee agreement results in a
transfer of a portion of the claim to the attorney at the time the
agreement is executed.' Whether section 83 applies to such a
transfer depends on whether a claim is considered property under
section 83. Under the broad regulatory definition of property, a
claim, or a portion of a claim, is considered property unless it is
classified as an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money in
the future.'97
A claim does not appear to constitute a mere promise to pay
money in the future. However, one might argue that a claim is
period of time, the risk is disregarded in determining whether a transfer occurs when ABC,
Inc. furnishes the stock to the employee. Id.
19 Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 1985).
"' See, e.g., Theophilos v. Comm'r, 85 F.3d 440, 445 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that binding
contract to purchase stock is property for § 83 purposes); Mark IV Pictures, Inc. v. Comm'r,
969 F.2d 669, 673 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that capital interest in partnership is property for
§ 83 purposes); Campbell v. Comm'r, 943 F.2d 815,818-21 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that profits
interest in partnership is property for § 83 purposes); Montelepre Systemed, Inc. v. Comm'r,
61 T.C.M. (CCH) 1782, 1786 (1991), affd, 956 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that right of
first refusal is property for § 83 purposes); Rev. Rul. 83-46, 1983-1 C.B. 16, 17 (ruling that
overriding royalty interest in oil and gas is property for § 83 purposes).
" See infra notes 196-210 and accompanying text (analyzing whether these property
interests constitute property for § 83 purposes).
196 See infra notes 211-37 and accompanying text (considering issue of whether transfer,
as that term is used in section 83, occurs upon execution of contingent fee agreement).
" See Tress. Reg. § 1.83-3(e), supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
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sufficiently similar to a promise to pay money and that it should be
treated as such. For example, a valid claim for damages in the
amount of $1,000,000 is similar to a promise by the defendant to the
plaintiff to pay such an amount. On its face, it appears this
argument (that a claim is sufficiently analogous to a promise to pay,
if it prevails) would remove a claim from the broad definition of
property for section 83 purposes, since such a claim is clearly
unfunded and unsecured.1 98 However, an unstated premise of the
regulatory definition of property is that, in order for a promise to
pay to fall outside the definition of property, the service recipient
must make the promise directly to the service provider.19 In other
words, the promise to pay must be a second party promise; it cannot
be made by a third party.
The origin of the promise to pay exception in the section 83
regulations is the well-established principle of tax law that, for
purposes of the cash method of accounting, the receipt of an account
receivable, or of a debt instrument evidencing an account receivable,
is not treated as a receipt of property."° As a result, such a receipt
generally does not result in the realization of income by the cash
method taxpayer. The following example is illustrative:
" See Childs v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 634,649-54 (1994) (setting forth conditions that must
be satisfied in order for promise to pay to be treated as "funded" or "secured"). Because a
plaintiff holding a valid claim is a general unsecured creditor of the defendant, the claim is
both unsecured and unfunded. See id. at 651.
See Rev. Rul. 77-420, 1977-2 C.B. 172 (ruling that where physician receives unfunded
and unsecured promise to pay from health insurer as compensation for services rendered to
patient, physician is taxed on fair market value of third party promise); Rev. Rul. 69-50, 1969-
1 C.B. 140 (same); see also JOSEPH DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE,
STRUCTURE AND PoLICY 748 n.3 (2d ed. 1999) (stating that third party promise is property for
purposes of § 83 even if such promise is unfunded and unsecured).
See BITTKER&LOKKEN, supra note 54, 60.4.2 (stating that "the exclusion of unfunded
and unsecured promises [in the § 83 regulations] preserves the long-standing principle that
these commitments are not taxed" when made to employees and contractors using cash
method of accounting). However, the doctrines of cash equivalency and constructive receipt
may override this principle in certain circumstances. See BITTKER ET AL., supra note 75,
39.02(2), at 39-17 to 39-18 (discussing cash equivalency doctrine); id. 1 39.02(3), at 39-19 to
39-26 (discussing constructive receipt doctrine). The discussion below assumes that these
doctrines are not relevant. See infra notes 202.04 and accompanying text. For the purposes




A provides services in Year 1 to B, who agrees to pay A
$1,000. B later makes full payment in Year 2. A does
not have income in Year 1 when he receives B's promise
to pay. Rather, A realizes income in Year 2 when he is
actually paid cash.2"' The result does not change even if,
in Year 1, B gives A a promissory note evidencing his
obligation to pay.
The purpose of this principle is to prevent the blurring of the cash
method of accounting, pursuant to which a taxpayer generally
realizes income upon the receipt of payment, with the accrual
method of accounting, pursuant to which a taxpayer generally
realizes income when it is earned regardless of the date of
payment.0 2
If the receipt of an account receivable triggered taxation for cash
method taxpayers, it would effectively put all taxpayers on the
accrual method with respect to income items. Since the receivable
is created upon the performance of services, both cash method and
accrual method taxpayers would be taxed at same time-when
services are performed. To prevent this blurring, the cash method
of accounting essentially ignores the receipt of an account receivable
or debt instrument evidencing such a receivable.03
' See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 177-78.
See BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 54, 1 105.3.2:
The basic difference between cash and accrual accounting is that the
latter requires accounts receivable and similar claims to be reported when
they arise from a credit transaction. The difference would be obliterated
if cash basis taxpayers were required to treat all claims against employ-
ers, clients, and customers as "property," to be valued and taken into
income when the services are rendered, rather than when the claims are
paid.
Id.
The notion that the receipt of a second party promise to pay does not result in income
is the backbone of traditional nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements. See Rev.
Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174 (concluding that deferred compensation arrangement, pursuant
to which employee receives unfunded and unsecured right to future cash payments, is
generally taxable to cash method employee when cash is paid, not when right is earned);
BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 54, 60.2.1 (noting that "[a] basic presupposition of Revenue
Ruling 60-31 is that until payment the employees were only general creditors of the
employer"). For example, if a service provider agrees, prior to Year 1, to defer his Year 1
wages until Year 2, the service provider will be taxed on the wages in Year 2 upon receipt of
the wages, even though the right to the wages is earned in Year 1. See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-
[Vol. 37:57
2002] TAXATION OF CONTINGENT FEES
However, the concern over the potential blurring of the two
methods of accounting is not present when a third party promise is
received. In that case, the service provider does not receive a mere
account receivable but rather receives a right to payment from a
third party. As an example:
Instead of giving A (the service provider) his own
promise to pay, B (the service recipient) gives A an
obligation of C to pay $1,000. In this case, the obligation
of C is not an obligation of the recipient of services, but
rather an obligation of a third party. As a result,
treating C's obligation as property will not blur the lines
between the cash and accrual method because C's
obligation is not a mere account receivable. Therefore,
A is taxed when he receives C's obligation.' 4
The purpose of the promise to pay exception to the definition of
property in the section 83 regulations is to ensure consistency with
the principle that the receipt by a cash method service provider of
an account receivable is inconsequential for tax purposes." 5 Even
1 C.B. 174.
2' See Rev. Rul. 77.420, 1977.2 C.B. 172 (ruling that where physician receives unfunded
and unsecured promise to pay from health insurer as compensation for services rendered to
patient, physician is taxed on fair market value of third party promise); Rev. Rul. 69-50, 1969-
1 C.B. 140; see also JOSEPH DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE AND
POLICY 748 n.3 (2d ed. 1999) (stating that third party promise is property for purposes of §
83 even if such promise is unfunded and unsecured).
2 See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 54, 60.2.1;
A jurisdictional conflict potentially exists between the general principles
governing the tax status of compensation and section 83, which provides
that property transferred in connection with the performance of services
is taxed to the services performer as soon as it is free of substantial risk
of forfeiture. The regulations under section 83 largely avoid this conflict
by defining "property" to exclude "an unfunded and unsecured promise to
pay money in the future."
Id.; see also WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS
5.02(1) n.20, at 5-6 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2002):
It seems clear that unfunded and unsecured rights to future payment
were excluded from the section 83 definition of "property" to prevent
section 83 from swallowing the cash method of accounting and thereby
subjecting traditional nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements
to immediate taxation. As broadly applicable as it is, section 83 was not
intended to supplant the substantial body of law governing deferred
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though the regulation does not explicitly require that the promise to
pay be made by the service recipient rather than a third party, in
order for the promise to be outside of the definition of property, it is
clear that such a requirement exists.2"e
compensation arrangements.
Id. (citation omitted).
" Unfortunately, the Tax Court failed to appreciate the origin of the promise to pay
exception in Childs v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 634, 649-54 (1994). In that case, the plaintiff,
who had previously entered into a contingent fee agreement with her attorney, settled a
personal injury lawsuit with the defendant. Id. at 637-42. Pursuant to the settlement
agreement, the defendant was obligated to make periodic payments to the plaintiff, and the
plaintiffs attorney agreed to accept periodic payments from the defendant as his fee. Id. at
641-42. At issue was whether the attorney recognized income in the year of the settlement,
when he received the defendant's promise to make periodic payments, or whether he
recognized income as the payments were received. Id. at 647-48.
The following example provides a simplified version of the Childs facts and the issue
involved:
Plaintiff enters into a contingent fee agreement pursuant to which she
will pay Attorney 40% of any recovery resulting from a personal injury
claim. In Year 1, Plaintiff agrees to accept a structured settlement in
which she will receive annual payments from Defendant of $60,000 for 10
years, with payments beginning in Year 2. In addition, Attorney will
receive as his fee annual payments from Defendant of $40,000 for 10
years, with payments beginning in Year 2.
The issue in Childs was whether Attorney must include in his Year I income the fair market
value of Defendant's obligation to pay him $40,000 a year for 10 years, or whether Attorney
could include the payments in Years 2 through 11 as they were received. See id. at 636. The
resolution of that issue depended on whether Defendant's obligation to pay money to Attorney
in the future constituted property for § 83 purposes. See id. at 648-49. This in turn depended
on whether Defendant's obligation constituted an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay.
See id. at 649-51. If so, the Defendant's obligation did not constitute property, and Attorney
would include the periodic payments in income as he received them in Years 2 through 11.
See id. at 649. If not, the Defendant's obligation constituted property, and Attorney would
include the fair market value of the obligation in Year 1. See id.
The Tax Court should have found that the obligation did constitute property because
the obligation to pay was a third party promise rather than a second party promise. See
Gordon T. Butler, Economic Benefit: Formulating a Workable Theory of Income Recognition,
27 SETON HALL L. REV. 70, 119-20 (1996) (arguing Childs is erroneous because court failed
to recognize that obligation in question was third party promise). In substance, Defendant
agreed to make $100,000 annual payments to Plaintiff who then transferred 40% of that
obligation to Attorney. The fact that, as a formal matter, Defendant will write two checks
every year (one to Plaintiff and one to Attorney) is irrelevant. See Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929). Thus, Attorney did not receive a promise to pay made by
the recipient of his services, but rather received a promise to pay made by a third party.
Because the Attorney received a third party promise, the Attorney should be taxed on the fair
market value of Defendant's obligation in Year 1.
However, the Childs court ruled otherwise, determining that Defendant's obligation
constituted an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay. See Childs, 103 T.C. at 651-53. As
a result, the Tax Court erroneously concluded that Attorney could include the payments in
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Applying this principle to the contingent fee arrangement, even
if a claim is analogous to a promise to pay, it is still property for
section 83 purposes. If the plaintiff transfers a portion of the claim
to her attorney, she transfers to the attorney a portion of the
defendant's promise to pay. The plaintiff is not transferring her own
promise to pay, which would be excluded from the definition of
property. As such, if a contingent fee agreement transfers a portion
of the plaintiffs claim to the attorney, the agreement results in a
transfer of property for purposes of section 83.
2. Is a Right to Proceeds from a Claim Property Under Section
83? This subsection assumes that the execution of a contingent fee
agreement results in an immediate "transfer," as the term is used
in section 83, - 7 of a right to the proceeds from a portion of the claim
to the attorney, rather than a portion of the claim itself.28 The
issue then arises whether such a right to proceeds constitutes
property under section 83.
The analysis here is essentially the same as the analysis in the
preceding subsection. 2" The right to proceeds does not appear to be
a mere promise to pay, but the same argument can be made that a
right to proceeds is similar to a promise to pay. For example, the
income as they were received. See id. at 653. The Tax Court was led astray by the IRS,
which apparently never argued the issue of the second party promise versus the third party
promise. Instead the IRS focused-on the issue of whether Defendant's promise was "secured"
or "funded," which was wholly irrelevant, since Defendant's third party promise constituted
property even ifit was neither secured nor funded. See Butler, supra, at 119-20. As a result
of this confusion, the Tax Court never focused on the critical fact that Defendant's promise
to pay was actually a third party promise, which always constitutes property for § 83
purposes. See Rev. Rul. 77-420, 1977-2 C.B. 172 (ruling that where physician receives
unfunded and unsecured promise to pay from health insurer as compensation for services
rendered to patient, physician is taxed on fair market value of third party promise); Rev. Rul.
69-50, 1969-1 C.B. 140 (same); see also DODGE ETAL., supra note 199 (stating that third party
promise is property for purposes of§ 83 even if such promise is unfunded and unsecured).
"" See I.R.C. § 83 (2000); see also infra notes 211-37 and accompanying text (discussing
issue of whether "transfer," as that term is used in § 83, occurs upon execution of contingent
fee agreement).
20 The distinction between the "no immediate transfer of property" characterization and
the "immediate transfer of a right to proceeds" characterization is'subtle. Under the former
characterization, a contingent fee agreement is entirely executory in that the plaintiff does
not perform her obligation until she pays her attorney out of the settlement proceeds. Under
the latter characterization, the agreement is no longer entirely executory in that the plaintiff
immediately performs her obligation by transferring to her attorney a right to the proceeds
of a portion of the claim at the time the fee agreement is executed.
2w See supra notes 196-206 and accompanying text.
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
plaintiffs transfer of a right to receive $1,000,000 of proceeds from
a claim is analogous to the plaintiffs transfer of the defendant's
promise to pay the $1,000,000. However, since the defendant's
promise to pay is a third-party promise, rather than a second-party
promise, the promise should be treated as property for section 83
purposes.210 Thus, a right to the proceeds from a claim is property.
3. Is There an Immediate Transfer Upon Execution of the
Contingent Fee Agreement? Having already concluded that a claim,
or a right to proceeds, constitutes property when transferred from
plaintiff to attorney, the analysis shifts to whether such a transfer,
as that term is used in section 83, occurs at the time a contingent
fee agreement is executed. In order for such a transfer to occur, the
attorney must acquire, at the time the contingent fee agreement is
executed, either an ownership interest in the attorney fee portion of
the claim or the right to the proceeds from the attorney fee
portion. "
a. Is There an Immediate Transfer of a Portion of the Claim?
This subsection analyzes whether, upon execution of the contingent
fee agreement, the plaintiff should be treated as transferring a
portion of the claim to her attorney, which was the precise issue
that was the focus of the courts in the contingent fee cases.212 The
property transfer cases determined that such a transfer occurred,
while the assignment of income cases concluded otherwise.2 3
The proper resolution of this issue depends on which taxpayer,
the attorney or the plaintiff, owns the attorney fee portion of the
claim after a contingent fee agreement is executed. A transferwill
be deemed to occur only if the attorney is considered the owner of
2'0 See supra notes 199-206 and accompanying text (discussing whether claim is property
under § 83 and concluding that it is if contingent fee agreement transfers portion of plaintiffs
claim to attorney).
"' Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(a)(1) (as amended in 1985). For this purpose, any risk that the
attorney might have to forfeit the claim or the right to proceeds in the future is disregarded.
Id. As discussed infra notes 239-43 and accompanying text, because the attorney forfeits any
right to compensation if he withdraws from the case prior to final disposition, the property
interest that the attorney receives under the "immediate transfer of property" characteriza-
tion is subject to a risk of forfeiture. However, in determining whether a transfer occurs
under § 83(a), this risk of forfeiture is entirely disregarded. Tress. Reg. § 1.83-3(a)(1); see also
I.R.C. § 83(a) (2000).
21 See supra notes 81-99 and accompanying text.
213 See id.
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that property for tax purposes.214
The issue of ownership for tax purposes is a common one.215 In
general, the resolution depends on all of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the ownership of the property, commonly referred to as
"the incidents of ownership." In the context of determining
ownership of a claim, or a portion thereof, the relevant incidents of
ownership are which taxpayer (1) has legal title of the claim, (2)
controls the claim, (3) would receive the benefit of future apprecia-
tion of the claim, and (4) bears the risk of loss with respect to the
claim.2"7
224 See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(a) (providing that transfer of property occurs when taxpayer
"acquires beneficial ownership intent in such property").
22' See generally Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 1221 (1981); Hilton v.
Comm'r, 74 T.C. 305 (1980); Decon Corp. v. Comm'r, 65 T.C. 829 (1976); Clinton Park Dev.
Co. v. Comm'r, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 768 (1952); Rev. Rul. 54-607, 1954-2 C.B. 177; Sager &
Cohen, supra note 8; see also Richard E. Marsh, Jr., Tax Ownership of Real Estate, 39 TAX
LAW. 563, 563 (1986) ("The threshold question in the taxation of real estate is the question
of ownership.").
220 See Grodt & McKay Realty, 77 T.C. at 1237 (analyzing facts and circumstances to
determine whether transfer of property occurred for tax purposes).
217 See id. at 1237-38 (discussing factors considered in determining whether transfer of
property occurred for tax purposes). At issue in Grodt & McKay was the identity of the owner
of cattle for tax purposes. Id. at 1236. In particular, the Tax Court analyzed whether a
transfer of the cattle occurred for tax purposes. Id. at 1221. The resolution of this issue
depended on whether the purported seller or buyer was the owner of the cattle for tax
purposes after the transaction. Id. at 1237. The Tax Court listed the following factors:
(1) Whether legal title passes; (2) how the parties treat the transaction
[i.e., as a sale or a loan]; (3) whether an equity was acquired in the
property; (4) whether the contract creates a present obligation on the
seller to execute and deliver a deed and a present obligation on the
purchaser to make payments; (5) whether the right of possession is vested
in the purchaser; (6) which party pays the property taxes; (7) which party
bears the risk of loss or damage to the property; and (8) which party
receives the profits from the operation and sale of the property.
Id. at 1237-38 (citations omitted). In the context of determining ownership of a claim, factors
2, 3, 4, and 6 are not applicable. With regard to the fifth factor, although a claim cannot be
"possessed," this factor is properly viewed as a control criterion because the party who
possesses the cattle controls the important decisions to be made with respect to the cattle.
Id. at 1241. In analyzing the fifth factor, the Tax Court stated:
Additionally, the agreements are clear that petitioners have no right to
possess the cattle or to exercise any real control or dominion over them.
Cattle Co. has complete control over the sale of animals, the sales price,
retention of progeny, the incorporation of progeny into the breeding herds,
the culling and replacing of herd animals, and the location, maintenance,
expansion, and breeding (including artificial insemination) of the herds.
Petitioners' only rights with respect to the possession, control, or dominion
of the herds are extremely limited and, as a practical matter, valueless.
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These incidents of ownership with respect to the attorney fee
portion of a claim are divided between the plaintiff and the attorney.
While the attorney will receive the benefit of a large award and bear
the burden of a defense verdict with respect to that portion of the
claim, the plaintiff retains legal title to the entire claim and controls
the entire claim, making the important decisions of whether and
when to settle the claim. Because the incidents of ownership are
divided, the issue of who owns the attorney fee portion of the claim
after the contingent fee agreement is a difficult one, with no
definitive answer. As a result, it is unclear whether a contingent fee
agreement should be treated as transferring a portion of the claim
from the plaintiff to the attorney.21 8
b. Is There an Immediate Transfer of a Right to Proceeds from
the Claim? Assuming that the plaintiff retains the attorney fee
portion of the claim even after execution of a contingent fee
agreement, an issue arises as to whether the execution of the
agreement results in an immediate transfer to the attorney of the
right to the proceeds from the attorney fee portion of the claim. In
this regard, Revenue Ruling 83-46, which deals with the receipt of
overriding royalty interests in oil and gas properties by service
providers, is analogous.219 Because Revenue Ruling 83-46 uses
terminology unique to oil and gas law, 220 a brief and general
explanation of this terminology is in order.
Id. (emphasis added).
218 The circuit court split on the issue of whether a contingent fee agreement transfers a
portion of the claim to the attorney is evidence of this lack of clarity. Three circuit courts
have held that such a transfer occurs. See supra note 6 (listing decisions of Fifth, Sixth, and
Eleventh Circuits). Eight circuit courts, and the Tax Court, have held otherwise. See supra
notes 4-5 (listing decisions of First, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and
Federal Circuits, as well as Tax Court). Fortunately, the resolution of this issue is not really
important. Whether the contingent fee agreement results in an immediate transfer of a
portion of the claim, or an immediate transfer of a right to the proceeds from a portion of the
claim, or even no immediate transfer whatsoever, the tax consequences are identical in that
the plaintiff must include the full settlement amount in gross income. See supra notes 180-86
and accompanying text (demonstrating that under no immediate transfer of property
characterization, plaintiff must include full settlement amount in gross income); infra notes
238-55 and accompanying text (demonstrating that under immediate transfer characteriza-
tion, plaintiff must include full settlement amount in gross income).
19 Rev. Rul. 83-46, 1983-1 C.B. 16.
w Id.
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Typically, the owner of land where oil and gas might be captured
will enter into an oil and gas lease with a lessee-developer who will
undertake the exploration, development, and production of oil and
gas. 221 The developer's interest under such a lease is referred to as
a working interest.222 The working interest entitles the developer
to all of the oil and gas produced on the land during the lease term,
subject to any royalty interests retained by the landowner. 2 ' A
landowner's royalty generally entitles the landowner to a specified
percentage of gross production-in other words, a percentage of the
gas or oil captured by the lessee without diminution for ex-
penses-during the lease term.224  In addition to a landowner's
royalty interest, the developer often will carve out of the working
interest overriding royalty interests and transfer these interests in
exchange for cash, property, or services.22 These overriding royalty
interests are economically identical to a landowner's royalty in that
they entitle the owner to a specified percentage of gross
production.226
For example, Landowner might enter into an oil and gas lease
with Developer under which Developer will be entitled to enter
Landowner's property for the purposes of exploring, developing, and
producing oil and gas. During the term of the oil and gas lease,
Landowner will be entitled to 1/8 of all of the gross production, and
"' Patrick L. O'Daniel, Note, Muddy Waters in the Pool of Capitak ZuHone and the
Abolition of the Doctrine, 70 TEX. L. REV. 243, 248-49 (1991).
2 Id. at 249.
m See HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 281
(1957) (defining term "working interest").
' O'Daniel, supra note 221, at 248-49. In addition to receiving a landowner's royalty, the
landowner might receive a lump sum payment of cash-a bonus--in consideration for
executing the oil and gas lease. Id.; see also WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 223, at 19
(defining term "bonus").
225 See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 223, at 173-74 (defining term "overriding
royalty"). In addition to overriding royalty interests, the developer may carve other interests
out of the working interest, such as production payments, net profits interests, and carried
interests, and then transfer in exchange for cash, property, or services. See J. DZIENKOWSKI
&R. PERONI, NATURAL RESOURCES TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 435-36, 471, 509-10
(1988) (discussing production payments, net profits interest, and carried interests).
Furthermore, it is not uncommon for the owner of a working interest to enter into a "farm out
agreement" in which the owner assigns the working interest, or a portion of it, to another
developer. O'Daniel, supra note 221, at 250; see also WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 223,
at 93 (defining term "farm out agreement").
m See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 223, at 134 (defining term "landowner royalty").
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Developer will be entitled to all of the remaining production.
Developer then assigns an overriding royalty interest to a geologist
for services rendered. This overriding royalty interest entitles the
geologist to 1/16 of all of the gross production to which the developer
is entitled during the lease term. Thus, the overriding royalty
interest entitles the geologist to 1/16 of 7/8, or 7/128 (5.4688%), of
the gross production. Therefore, if the land produces $1,000,000
worth of oil and gas during the lease term, 1/8 (or $125,000) will go
to Landowner, 7/128 (or $54,688) will go to the geologist, and the
remainder ($820,312) is retained by Developer.
Revenue Ruling 83-46 dealt with the tax consequences that arise
when a taxpayer receives an overriding royalty interest in exchange
for services.227 In particular, Revenue Ruling 83-46 analyzed
whether the receipt of an overriding royalty interest by a service
provider triggered immediate taxation on the fair market value of
the royalty interest, or whether the service provider would be taxed
only when he actually received the oil and gas proceeds.228 In the
above context involving the geologist, the issue was whether the
geologist would be taxed upon receipt of the 1/16 overriding royalty
interest, or whether he would be taxed only when he received the
$54,688 of proceeds. 229 The resolution of this issue depended on
whether the assignment of an overriding royalty interest constituted
such a "transfer of property" for purposes of section 83.230 Without
any discussion, the IRS concluded that the assignment of an
overriding royalty interest constituted a transfer of property.281
Therefore, pursuant to section 83(a), a service provider who receives
an overriding royalty interest is required to include the fair market
value of the interest in his gross income in the year he receives the
interest.232





2 Id.; see also I.R.C. § 83(a) (2000); Zuhone v. Comm'r, 883 F.2d 1317, 1323 (7th Cir.
1989). But see G.C.M. 22,730 (originating "pool of capital" doctrine which would allow service
provider who receives overriding royalty interest to avoid tax in year of receipt); see also
Zuhone, 883 F.2d at 1319-23 (discussing pool of capital doctrine and its doubtful continuing
viability in light of Revenue Ruling 83-46).
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The issue in Revenue Ruling 83-46 is a close call, with no clearly
correct result. The IRS could very easily have determined that the
assignment of an overriding royalty interest constituted a mere
promise by the developer to pay a specified fraction of production to
the service provider in the future. Under this analysis, the receipt
of the overriding royalty interest would have no tax consequences,
and the service provider would be taxed only when he received the
oil and gas proceeds.2 3 The IRS, however, determined otherwise,
concluding that the assignment of an overriding royalty interest was
a transfer of property for purposes of section 83.34
The assignment of an overriding royalty interest by a developer
to a service provider is analogous to a contingent fee arrangement.23
In the oil and gas context, the developer, in exchange for services,
forgoes a specified percentage of the proceeds from his property
while retaining ownership and control of the underlying property.
In the contingent fee context, the plaintiff, in exchange for services,
forgoes a specified percentage of the proceeds recovered in litigation
while retaining ownership and control of the underlying property.
Therefore, Revenue Ruling 83-46 supports the conclusion that the
execution of the contingent fee agreement, like the execution of an
assignment of an overriding royalty interest in exchange for
services, results in an immediate transfer of a right to proceeds from
a portion of the plaintiffs claim which is subject to section 83.236
' See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 1985) (providing that unfunded and
unsecured promise to pay money or property in future is not "property" for purposes of § 83).
If the execution of the assignment of an overriding royalty interest is viewed as the making
of a mere promise by the developer to make a future payment, then the assignment would not
result in a transfer of property'for purposes of § 83. Id. In such a case, there would be no tax
consequences to either party until the payment was actually made. Id.
2U Id.
' This assumes that the execution of the contingent fee agreement does not result in an
immediate transfer to the attorney of a portion of the plaintiffs claim. In other words, this
assumes that the plaintiff retains ownership of the claim after the contingent fee agreement
is executed.
2 See I.R.C. § 83 (2000); Rev. Rul. 83-46, 1983-1 C.B. 17. The issue of whether the
execution of a contingent fee agreement results in an immediate transfer of a right to the
proceeds from the attorney fee portion of the claim, or whether the agreement is purely
executory (i.e., because the plaintiff merely promises to make a payment in the future), is
particularly difficult because the economic substance of both transactions is the same. The
issue, however, is immaterial since the ultimate tax consequences are the same under either
characterization. In either event, the plaintiff would be required to include the full
settlement amount in gross income. See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text
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The following section of this Article demonstrates that section 83
would require the plaintiff to include the entire settlement
amount-including the attorney's fee portion-in gross income,
which is the same result as under the no immediate transfer
characterization.3 7
4. Application of the Operative Provisions of Section 83 to the
Contingent Fee Arrangement. Assuming that the execution of the
contingent fee agreement results in an immediate transfer of
property (either the attorney's fee portion of the claim or the right
to the proceeds from such portion) section 83 applies to the transfer.
Section 83 provides that, in cases where property is transferred
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, the transfer is disregarded
for tax purposes until the substantial risk of forfeiture lapses.3 8
A substantial risk of forfeiture exists when a "person's rights to
full enjoyment of such property are conditioned upon the future
performance of substantial services by any individual."239 For
example, assume that an employee receives shares of stock subject
to the obligation that he return the shares if his employment is
terminated prior to a specified date. The employee's full enjoyment
of the property is conditioned on the future performance of services;
as a result, a substantial risk of forfeiture exists until the stock
"vests" on the specified date.24
Assuming that the contingent fee agreement results in an
immediate transfer of property, is the property transferred subject
to a substantial risk of forfeiture? The answer is yes. The general
rule is that regardless of the specific language of the contingent fee
agreement, an attorney forfeits any right to a fee if the attorney
(demonstrating that under no immediate transfer of property characterization, plaintiff must
include entire settlement in gross income); infra notes 238-55 and accompanying text
(demonstrating that under immediate transfer of property characterization, plaintiff must
include entire settlement in gross income).
.. See supra notes 179-86 and accompanying text.
' I.R.C. § 83(a) (2000); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(a) (1978) ("Until [the] property
becomes substantially vested, the transferor shall be regarded as the owner of such
property."). If, however, the transferee of property transferred subject to a substantial risk
of forfeiture makes an election under § 83(b), the risk of forfeiture is ignored and the transfer
is given immediate tax effect. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(a) (1978). None of the contingent fee cases
indicate that the attorney made a § 83(b) election.
2 I.R.C. § 83(c)(1) (2000).
240 See id.
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withdraws from the case or is discharged for cause prior to final
disposition of the matter.24 Thus, in. order for the attorney to
receive the full benefits of his ownership of the attorney fee portion
of the claim, the attorney must provide legal services until the
property "vests" upon final disposition of the case.242 Otherwise, the
attorney loses the benefit of the transferred property in that his
right to the agreed-upon percentage of the claim is forfeited. As a
result, the attorney's receipt of property upon execution of a
contingent fee agreement is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture
until final disposition of the case.24
Because of this substantial risk of forfeiture, the transfer of the
attorney fee portion of the claim is disregarded for tax purposes
until the risk lapses.244 This lapse occurs upon final disposition of
243 F.B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 77-80 (1964); CHARLES W.
WOLFiAN, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 556 (1986). Even if an attorney withdraws for cause or
is discharged without cause, the majority rule is that the attorney may recover only the
reasonable value of his services under the doctrine of quantum meruit, rather than the
specified percentage of the settlement. MACKINNON, supra at 79. Furthermore, the attorney
may not recover more under quantum meruit than the specified percentage. Id. This
potential quantum meruit recovery does not undermine the conclusion that the attorney
receives his property subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. The contingent fee
arrangement is similar to a restricted stock grant where the employee must return the stock
if prior to a specified period he leaves employment voluntarily or is terminated with cause,
but the employee is entitled to retain the stock if during the specified period he leaves
employment for cause or is terminated without cause. In such a restricted stock grant, it is
clear that a substantial risk of forfeiture exists. See, e.g., Alves v. Comm'r, 79 T.C. 864, 867-
72 (1982) (stating stock was subject to substantial risk of forfeiture where taxpayer received
stock from his employer subject to obligation that he resell stock to employer at ten cents per
share if, prior to expiration of specified period, taxpayer voluntarily left employment or was
terminated for cause).
242 The same analysis applies if the plaintiff is deemed to transfer, at the time the
contingent fee agreement is executed, a right to the proceeds from the attorney fee portion
of the claim, as opposed to the attorney fee portion of the claim itself. The right to proceeds
would "vest" upon final disposition. Therefore, a substantial risk of forfeiture exists prior to
final disposition. Because the analysis in this subsection is the same regardless of whether
the attorney is treated as receiving a portion of the claim or a right to the proceeds from a
portion of the claim upon execution of the contingent fee agreement, the discussion assumes
that the attorney receives a portion of the claim itself.
24 See Gregg D. Polsky, Taxing Contingent Attorneys'Fees: Many Courts are Getting it
Wrong, 89 TAX NOTES 917, 920 (2000).
2" See I.R.C. § 83(a) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(a) (1978). The discussion in this section
assumes that the attorney does not make a § 83(b) election. None of the contingent fee cases
indicate that the attorney made such an election. Because an attorney would never gain from
making a § 83(b) election, and because the election exposes the attorney to a significant
amount of risk, an attorney would not ordinarily make such an election. See Polsky, supra
note 243, at 920 n.32 (stating attorney should not make § 83(b) election because he receives
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the case, at which time the transfer takes effect for tax purposes.
At that time, the attorney must include the fair market value of the
attorney fee portion of the claim in his gross income.245
In addition, upon final disposition of the case, since the plaintiff
transfers property-the attorney fee portion of the claim-with a
basis of zero in exchange for services, the plaintiff realizes income
in an amount equal to the fair market value of such property
determined as of the date of the final disposition246 and receives a
miscellaneous itemized deduction for this amount.247 Furthermore,
the plaintiff must include in gross income the amount of the
settlement that she actually receives.248 As the following example
demonstrates, the tax consequences to all parties are the same as
under the "no immediate transfer" characterization:
In Year 1, Plaintiff and Attorney execute a contingent
fee agreement pursuant to which forty percent of Plain-
tiffs employment discrimination claim is assigned to
Attorney. In Year 2, Plaintiff settles the case for
$1,000,000. The settlement proceeds are distributed
pursuant to the contingent fee agreement-$400,000 to
Attorney and $600,000 to Plaintiff.
If the contingent fee agreement results in an immediate transfer of
forty percent of the claim, section 83(a) provides that since the forty
percent portion would be forfeited if Attorney withdraws from the
no benefit, and because there is risk that attorney and IRS will disagree on value).
2' See I.R.C. § 83(a) (2000). The character of the attorney's income would be ordinary
compensation income. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(a) (1978). When the attorney actually
receives the cash from the settlement, he will have no further income since his basis in the
attorney fee portion of the settlement equals the amount of the cash he receives. See §§ 1001,
1012.
246 See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(d) (1978). This regulation merely restates the well-established
principle that a transfer of property in exchange for services constitutes a realization event.
See, e.g., Int'l Freighting Corp. v. Comm'r, 135 F.2d 310, 313-14 (2d Cir. 1943); United States
v. Gen. Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir. 1960); Riley v. Comm'r, 328 F.2d 428, 429 (5th Cir.
1964). The same result is obtained if, upon execution of the contingent fee agreement, the
plaintiff is treated as immediately transferring a right to the proceeds from the attorney fee
portion of the claim, rather than a portion of the claim itself, because the plaintiff has no
basis in such right. See I.R.C. § 1012.
'A See I.R.C. §§ 67(a), 162(a) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(a)(1) (1978).
248 See I.R.C. § 61(a) (2000).
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case prior to final disposition, the transfer is disregarded for tax
purposes until such final disposition.2 49 At that time, the transfer
is given tax effect, and Plaintiff is deemed to transfer the forty
percent portion, which is then worth $400,000.250 As a result,
Attorney must report $400,000 of ordinary income.25 ' In addition,
Plaintiff has gross income in the amount of $400,000, the amount by
which the fair market value of the forty percent portion exceeds
Plaintiffs basis of zero in the property. 252 Furthermore, Plaintiff
receives a miscellaneous itemized deduction in the amount of
$400, 000.253 Plaintiff also must include in gross income the
$600,000 amount of the settlement that she actually receives.2 4
Thus, Plaintiff includes a total amount of $1,000,000 in gross
income, and receives a $400,000 miscellaneous itemized deduction,
which is the same result as under the no immediate transfer
characterization.255
V. THE PARTNERSHIP CHARACTERIZATION
Some proponents of the exclusion method contend that a
contingent fee arrangement creates a partnership for tax
purposes. 256 Under this characterization, the plaintiff contributes
249 See I.R.C. § 83(a) (2000).
2w See id.
2" See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(1), 83(a) (2000). When Attorney actually receives the $400,000 fee
in cash, it will be attributable to the $400,000 attorney fee portion of the claim. Since
Attorney will have a $400,000 basis in that property, Attorney recognizes no further income
upon receipt of the cash. See §§ 1001, 1012.
2 See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(b) (as amended in 2000). The character of this $400,000
income should be ordinary under the theory that the value received by Plaintiff (here, legal
services) was received as a substitution for ordinary income. See Comm'r v. P.G. Lake, Inc.,
356 U.S. 260, 264-65 (1958) (holding that lump sum amount received as consideration for
transfer of oil and other mineral payment rights was taxable to seller as ordinary income);
Davis v. Comm'r, 119 T.C. No. 1, 7 (2002) (holding that amount received from sale of rights
to lottery proceeds -was taxable to seller as ordinary income).
m See I.R.C. § 162(a) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(a) (as amended in 2000).
2 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (2000).
m See supra notes 179-86 and accompanying text (demonstrating that under no
immediate transfer characterization, plaintiff must include entire settlement amount in gross
income).
' See, e.g., Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854, 857 (6th Cir. 2000)
(analogizing contingent fee arrangement to partnership); Robert W. Wood, The Energizer
Bunny Has Nothing on the Attorneys'Fee Debate, 88 TAX NOTES 1059 (2000) (same).
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her claim and the attorney contributes his services to the capital of
the partnership, with each party receiving a partnership interest.25 7
According to these proponents, this characterization would allow the
plaintiff to exclude the attorney fee portion of the settlement from
her gross income.258
In Bagley v. Commissioner,"' the taxpayer, in an attempt to
avoid the contingent fee problem, argued that a partnership was
created when he entered into a contingent fee agreement with his
attorney.26 0 The Tax Court rejected this partnership characteriza-
tion, concluding that the contingent fee agreement created an
independent contractor relationship pursuant to which the attorney
would receive contingent compensation for services rendered.26 The
Tax Court based this conclusion on its factual determination that
the taxpayer and his attorney did not intend to form a partnership
when they entered into the contingent fee agreement:
Based on the record, we find that there is nothing to
indicate that the parties intended the contingency fee
arrangement to be a joint venture or partnership. [The
attorney] testified that he regarded the agreement
between himself and [plaintiff] as nothing more than an
arrangement for the payment of his services.... There
is . . . no testimony whatsoever that either party in-
tended to form a partnership. [Plaintiff] did not report
any profit or loss from any partnership with [the attor-
ney], but instead claimed a miscellaneous itemized
deduction for attorney's fees paid. We, therefore, find
[plaintiffs partnership] argument to be without merit.262
This Part will demonstrate that even if a partnership had been
created for tax purposes, the contingent fee problem would not be
See Estate of Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857.
See id. at 857-58.
105 T.C. 396 (1995).
'6 Id. at 418.
261 Id. at 418-19.
62 Id. at 419.
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avoided.263
The analysis in this Part assumes that upon execution of the
contingent fee agreement, a partnership between the plaintiff and
attorney is created for tax purposes, with the plaintiff contributing
her entire claim to the capital of the partnership, and the attorney
contributing his services.264 In exchange for these contributions,
each party receives a partnership interest. When a settlement is
reached, the proceeds are paid to the plaintiff-attorney partnership
and then distributed to the parties in accordance with, their
respective partnership interests.
A. IS THE ATTORNEY'S PARTNERSHIP INTEREST A CAPITAL INTEREST
OR A PROFITS INTEREST?
In analyzing the tax consequences of the partnership character-
ization, the first step is to determine the nature of the attorney's
partnership interest. Specifically, that interest must be classified
as either a capital interest or a profits interest.
A capital interest is defined as an interest which would entitle
the holder to "a share of the proceeds if the partnership's assets
were sold at fair market value and then the proceeds were distrib-
uted in a complete liquidation of the partnership." ' 5  In other
See infra notes 265-308 and accompanying text.
2 Whether a partnership is in fact created for tax purposes pursuant to a contingent fee
arrangement is a difficult issue. See MCKEE ET AL., supra note 205, 1 3.01(1), at 3-4 (noting
that "[tlhe most basic, and perhaps the most difficult, problem in the taxation of partnerships
is the determination of whether a particular financial, business, or otherwise economic
arrangement constitutes a partnership for income tax purposes"). Fortunately, because the
partnership characterization results in the same tax consequences as under the "no
immediate transfer" characterization and the "immediate transfer of property" characteriza-
tion, the issue is immaterial. See supra notes 179-86, 238-55 and accompanying text. As a
result, the issue is not addressed in this Article. For an in-depth discussion of the factors that
are relevant to the determination of whether a partnership exists for tax purposes, see
MCKEE ET AL., supra note 205, 11 3.02-.03, at 3-9, 3-24. Judge Beghe of the Tax Court has
noted that if a partnership was deemed created for tax purposes when a contingent fee
agreement was executed, it would "open the door to tax avoidance by attorneys who enter into
contingent fee agreements." Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 453-54 (2000) (Beghe, J.,
dissenting). In particular, Judge Beghe worried that "attorneys would contend that
partnership characterization entitles them to distributive shares of the tax-free recoveries in
personal injury actions and to current deductions for the advances of costs they make to their
clients." Id. at 454.
2 Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343, § 2.01.
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words, a capital interest is one that would result in a distribution of
cash to the interest holder upon a hypothetical liquidation immedi-
ately after receipt of the interest.2" Alternatively, a profits interest
is an interest that would entitle the holder to no cash upon such a
hypothetical liquidation. 2 7 Thus, a profits interest, as distinguished
from a capital interest, "entitles the recipient only to a share of
future profits and appreciation."" 8
With respect to the plaintiff-attorney partnership, the attorney's
interest constitutes a capital interest because the contingent fee
agreement gives him a specified percentage of the claim as opposed
to the right to a specified percentage of any post-agreement
appreciation in the value of the claim. The following example
demonstrates this point:
Plaintiff and Attorney enter into a contingent fee
agreement pursuant to which Attorney will receive a fee
equal to forty percent of the recovery. At the time the
agreement is executed, the claim has a value of $10,000.
Assuming that the agreement results in a partnership
for tax purposes, Plaintiff will receive a sixty percent
interest in the partnership in exchange for her contribu-
tion of the claim, and Attorney will receive a forty
percent interest in exchange for his services.
Attorney's interest in the partnership is a capital interest 269
because, if the claim was sold for fair market value immediately
after execution of the fee agreement and thereafter the partnership
was liquidated, Attorney would receive a distribution of $4,000.27
Id.
2" Id. § 2.02.
MCKEE ETAL., supra note 205, 9 5.01, at 5-3.
If the claim has absolutely no value at the time the contingent fee agreement is
executed, Attorney's interest would be a profits interest because, upon the hypothetical
liquidation, neither partner would receive any proceeds. However, this result rests on the
factual premise that Plaintiffs claim has zero value at the same time Attorney agrees to
provide valuable time and resources to prosecute the claim. Given such an agreement, it
would appear to be very difficult to prove that Plaintiffs claim has no value whatsoever at the
time the contingent fee agreement is executed.
279 Attorney's partnership interest is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. As a
result, an issue arises as to when the profits interest versus capital interest determination
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B. APPLICATION OF SECTION 83 TO THE ATTORNEY'S RECEIPT OF THE
PARTNERSHIP INTEREST
Because a capital interest constitutes property for section 83
purposes, 71 the transfer of the partnership interest to the attorney
is subject to section 83. Because state law provides that an attorney
relinquishes any right to compensation if he withdraws from a case
prior to final disposition, the attorney's partnership interest is
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.272 Consequently, the
attorney's receipt of the partnership interest is treated as occurring
when the risk of forfeiture lapses on the date of final disposition of
the case, rather than when the contingent fee agreement is exe-
cuted.7 3 Therefore, as the following example demonstrates, no
partnership exists prior to final disposition:2 4
In Year 1, Plaintiff and Attorney enter into a contingent
fee agreement pursuant to which Attorney will receive
a fee equal to forty percent of the recovery. In Year 2,
the case is settled for $1,000,000, with Plaintiff receiving
$600,000 and Attorney receiving $400,000.
should be made. See MCKEE ET AL., supra note 205, 1 5.03(1), at 5-30 to 5-31. There are two
possibilities. Id. Either the hypothetical liquidation occurs at the time Attorney receives the
partnership interest, which is when the contingent fee agreement is executed, or the
hypothetical liquidation occurs at the time Attorney's partnership interest vests, which is
upon final disposition of the case. Id. The foregoing example analyzes a hypothetical
liquidation taking place at the time Attorney receives his partnership interest, although, in
this case, Attorney's interest would be a capital interest even if the hypothetical liquidation
took place at the time of vesting.
"' See Mark IV Pictures, Inc. v. Comm'r, 969 F.2d 669, 673 (8th Cir. 1992). For a
discussion regarding the controversial issue of whether a profits interest should constitute
property for § 83 purposes, see MCKEE ET AL., supra note 205, 5.02, at 5-5 to 5-7.
211 See supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
2' See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(a)(1) (1978) (providing that when property is transferred
subject to substantial risk of forfeiture, "the transferor shall be regarded as the owner of such
property"). If the attorney makes a § 83(b) election, then the attorney's receipt of the
partnership interest will be deemed to occur on the date he receives the interest, rather than
on the date the interest vests. See I.R.C. § 83(b) (2000). The discussion below assumes that
no § 83(b) election is made.
274 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 1999) (providing that partnership needs
at least two members).
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Assuming that the agreement results in a partnership for tax
purposes, Attorney will be deemed to receive his partnership
interest in Year 2 upon settlement, which is when Attorney's
interest vests. Thus, prior to vesting in Year 2, Plaintiff is the only
"partner," and as a result, no partnership exists prior to vesting.
Upon such vesting, a partnership is formed, with Attorney receiving
a capital interest in the partnership. '75
C. TAX CONSEQUENCES OF THE PARTNERSHIP CHARACTERIZATION
The Tax Court case of McDougal v. Commissioner27 governs the
tax consequences to the plaintiff and the attorney resulting from the
formation of their partnership upon settlement. 7  In that case,
McDougal purchased a race horse for $10,000 on January 1, 1968,
which was subsequently trained by another taxpayer. 8 On October
4, 1968, McDougal and the trainer formed a partnership. McDougal
received a fifty percent capital interest in the partnership in
exchange for contributing the race horse, which then had a fair
market value of $60,000, and the trainer received a fifty percent
capital interest in exchange for the training services he provided
between January 1, 1968 and October 4, 1968.279 Thus, McDougal
received his capital interest in exchange for his contribution of
property, while the trainer received his capital interest in exchange
for past services provided for the benefit of McDougal. s8 °
The issue in the case was whether McDougal realized a gain upon
the formation of the partnership. 28' The Tax Court held that
McDougal did realize a gain, concluding that the form of the
transaction-a nontaxable capital contribution of the
horse-differed from its substance.282 The court concluded that
McDougal should be treated as first transferring an undivided half
" See id.
2'0 62 T.C. 720 (1974).
277 Id. at 722.
278 Id. at 721-22.
219 Id. at 721.
Id. at 724.
2' Id. at 725.
2 Id. at 725-26.
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interest in the horse to the trainer in exchange for past services. 2 3
Immediately thereafter, McDougal and the trainer should each be
treated as contributing their respective half interests in the horse
to the partnership in exchange for their respective fifty percent
capital interests in the partnership. M
As a result of the Tax Court's recasting of the transaction,
McDougal realized a $25,000 gain upon the transfer of the half
interest to the trainer.' In addition, McDougal received a $30,000
deduction for his payment of compensation to the trainer,2" while
the trainer received $30,000 in compensation income. 8 7
The McDougal facts are analogous to the facts underlying a
plaintiff-attorney partnership resulting from a contingent fee
arrangement."8 When upon final disposition of the case the
partnership is formed for tax purposes, the plaintiff contributes her
claim in exchange for a capital interest, while the attorney receives
a capital interest in exchange for past services provided to the
plaintiff."9 Thus, the plaintiff is in the same position as McDougal,
while the attorney is in the same position as the trainer.2 Under
McDougal, the partnership formation is recast as a transfer by
plaintiff to attorney of the attorney fee portion of the claim in
consideration for past services, and plaintiff and attorney are then
treated as transferring their respective interests in the claim to the
partnership in exchange for capital interests in the partnership.21
As a result of the first prong of the recast transaction-the
transfer from the plaintiff to the attorney of the attorney fee portion
u3 Id. at 725.
2N Id.
28' Id. at 727. The fair market value of the half interest was $30,000, and McDougal had
a $5,000 basis in such interest. Id. Gain was recognized pursuant to the principle that the
transfer of property in exchange for services constitutes a realization event. Id. at 726; see
also Int'l Freighting Corp. v. Comm'r, 135 F.2d 310, 313-14 (2d Cir. 1943) (providing that
realization event occurs when taxpayer transfers property in exchange for services); Treas.
Reg. § 1.83-6(b) (1978) (same).
' McDougal, 62 T.C. at 728; see also I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (2000) (providing that reasonable
compensation expense incurred in connection with trade or business is deductible).
27 McDougal, 62 T.C. at 723; see also I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (2000) (providing that gross income
includes compensation for services).
28 See McDougal, 62 T.C. at 721-24.
2" See id. at 723-24.
"0 See id. at 721-24.
29' See id. at 725-26.
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of the claim-the plaintiff realizes a gain in an amount equal to the
fair market value of such portion."' In addition, the plaintiff
receives a miscellaneous itemized deduction equal to the fair market
value, and the attorney realizes income in that amount.9 3
With respect to the second prong of the recast transaction-the
plaintiffs and the attorney's contributions of their respective
portions of the claim to the partnership-there are no immediate tax
consequences. When the partnership receives the settlement
amount, the plaintiff is allocated all of the remaining built-in gain
in the claim. 2" The end result to the parties is the same as under
the "no immediate transfer" characterization and the "immediate
transfer of property" characterization. Consider the following
example:
In Year 1, Plaintiff and Attorney enter into a contingent
fee agreement pursuant to which Attorney will receive
a fee equal to forty percent of the recovery. In Year 2,
the case is settled for $1,000,000 with Plaintiff receiving
$600,000 and Attorney receiving $400,000.
Assuming that the contingent fee agreement results in a partner-
ship for tax purposes, Plaintiff receives a sixty percent interest in
the partnership in exchange for her contribution of the claim, and
Attorney receives a forty percent interest in exchange for his
services. Section 83 defers the formation of the partnership until
Attorney's interest vests in Year 2 upon final disposition of the
case.
295
When the partnership is formed upon settlement of the case in
Year 2, McDougal provides a two-step recast of the transaction.296
First, the Plaintiff is treated as transferring the forty percent
attorney fee portion of the claim to Attorney in consideration for
' See Int'l Freighting Corp. v. Comm'r, 135 F.2d 310, 313 (2d Cir. 1943); Treas. Reg. §
1.83-6(b) (as amended in 2000).
' See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(a) (as amended in 2000).
2' See I.R.C. § 704(c) (2000).
2 See I.R.C. § 83(a) (2000).
' See McDougal v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 720, 724-26 (1974).
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past services.29 Second, Plaintiff and Attorney are then treated as
transferring their respective interests in the claim to the partner-
ship for capital interests.298 As a result of the first-step transfer of
the attorney fee portion, Plaintiff recognizes a gain of $400,000 and
receives a miscellaneous itemized deduction in the same amount.29
In addition, Attorney has $400,000 of income."° As a result of the
second-step contributions to the partnership, neither party recog-
nizes income."el Plaintiff takes a zero basis in her partnership
interest;302 Attorney takes a $400,000 basis in his partnership
interest;3 3 and the partnership takes a $400,000 basis in the
claim.3"4
When the partnership receives the settlement proceeds, it
realizes a $600,000 gain,0 5 all of which is allocated to Plaintiff.30 6
When the partnership distributes the settlement proceeds ($600,000
to Plaintiff, $400,000 to Attorney), no further income is realized by
Plaintiff or Attorney because their bases in their respective
partnership interests equal the amount of liquidation proceeds they
each receive.' Plaintiff thus realizes a total amount of $1,000,000
of gross income and receives a $400,000 miscellaneous itemized
deduction, which is the same result as under the no immediate
transfer of property characterization and the immediate transfer of
property characterization. 308
See I.R.C. § 724 (2000).
See I.R.C. § 725 (2000).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(a)-(b) (as amended in 2000).
3 See I.R.C. § 61 (2000). Attorney takes a "tax cost" basis of $400,000 in his portion of
the claim. See § 1012.
30' See I.R.C. § 721 (2000).
See I.R.C. § 722. (2000)
3 See id.
3" See I.R.C. § 723 (2000).
See I.R.C. § 1001 (2000).
See I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(A) (2000). Treas. Reg. § 1.704.3(b)(1) (as amended in 2000).
0 See I.R.C. § 705(a). Plaintiffs basis in her partnership interest equals $600,000
because her initial basis of zero was increased to $600,000 as a result of the allocation of
income to her under § 704(c)(1)(a). See § 704(c)(1)(A).
' See supra notes 179-86 and accompanying text (demonstrating that under no
immediate transfer of property characterization plaintiffmust include full settlement amount
in gross income); supra notes 238-55 and accompanying text (demonstrating that under




VI. THE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
This Article thus far has demonstrated that the contingent
attorney's fee problem is inevitable under current law. Under the
no immediate transfer characterization, the immediate transfer of
property characterization, or even the partnership characterization,
the plaintiff must include the full settlement amount in gross
income and take a miscellaneous itemized deduction for the attorney
fee portion of the settlement.3 °
The legislative solution is overwhelmingly simple. Attorney's
fees paid for the purpose of generating a taxable recovery should be
deductible in full without impairment. Therefore, a simple amend-
ment to section 62, adding these fees to the list of deductions that
are taken into account in computing gross income, would suffice.
VII. CONCLUSION
Courts are divided with regard to the tax treatment of contingent
attorney fee arrangements. Some courts conclude that a plaintiff
must include the full settlement amount in gross income and take
a miscellaneous itemized deduction for the attorney fee portion of
the settlement. Because of the limitations on miscellaneous
itemized deductions under section 67, section 68, and the AMT, this
approach provides the wrong policy result by overstating the
plaintiffs true income. Other courts conclude that a plaintiff may
exclude the attorney fee portion of the settlement from gross income.
This approach provides the right policy result, taxing the plaintiff
only on her net recovery.
All of the courts faced with the contingent attorney fee issue have
focused on the assignment of income doctrine. They have analyzed
whether the contingent fee agreement transfers a portion of the
claim (i.e., tree) or merely a right to the income from a portion of the
claim (i.e., fruit). However, this focus is misplaced because the
assignment of income doctrine is inapplicable to a contingent fee
arrangement, where the plaintiff and the attorney are engaging in
" See id.; supra notes 265-308 and accompanying text (demonstrating that under
partnership characterization, plaintiff must include full settlement amount in gross income).
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an entirely arm's length commercial transaction. Due to this
misplaced focus, the courts have not analyzed the contingent
attorney fee issue correctly.
A contingent fee arrangement is susceptible to two characteriza-
tions. Either the execution of the contingent fee agreement results
in no immediate transfer of property under section 83, or the
execution results in an immediate transfer of property, regardless
of whether the property constitutes fruit or tree for assignment of
income doctrine purposes. Under either characterization, the wrong
policy result-that the plaintiff must include the full settlement
amount in gross income and take a miscellaneous itemized deduc-
tion for the attorney fee portion-is inevitable. The same unfortu-
nate result is obtained even if the contingent fee arrangement is
characterized as a partnership for tax purposes.
Consequently, the only solution to the contingent attorney fee
problem is a legislative amendment. Attorney's fees paid for the
purpose of generating taxable recoveries should be deductible in full
without impairment. To solve the problem, section 62 must be
amended to add these attorney's fees to the list of deductions taken
into account in computing the taxpayer's adjusted gross income.
2002]

